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ABSTRACT
The debate over how to regulate sex work in Canada has long occupied courts,
governments, policymakers, sex workers and activists. In the aftermath of the Supreme
Court decision in Bedford v Canada and the enactment of the constitutionally suspect
Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, this thesis examines municipal
law’s potential role in regulating brothels. Municipalities already grant licenses to adult
service providers, the licensing of brothels is a natural extension of their powers. The
current licensing regimes are in need of reform, both for adult services and before any
attempts to license brothels. This thesis uses New Zealand as an example of an effective
licensing regime. By treating the sex trade akin to other industries and respecting the
expertise of those who work in it, there are minimal disruptions in communities and safer
working conditions for employees.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

From the day that dominatrix Terri-Jean Bedford first cracked her whip on the
steps of a Toronto courthouse, Canadians were engrossed by the debate about how sex
work should be regulated in this country. The sale of sex between consenting adults was
not a criminal offence.1 Bedford, along with co-applicants Valerie Scott and Amy
Lebovitch challenged three Criminal Code provisions that made it illegal to sell sex
safely.2 Their victory at the Supreme Court of Canada could have prompted the beginning
of decriminalized sex work in Canada and the ability for municipalities to develop
licensing bylaws which explicitly regulate sex work. The concept is neither new nor
startling. As this this thesis will detail, a wealth of research supports the decriminalization
of voluntary adult sex work, coupled with regulation of the industry. New Zealand
provides a suitable model for success. The introduction of Bill C-36 signaled that the
Federal Government was not prepared to allow that to happen.3
A future challenge to the new criminal law, however, could again open the door to
the possibility of decriminalized sex work. The term decriminalization typically means
the repeal of all criminal law provisions - “so that it is no longer a prohibited act”.4 It is
somewhat of a misnomer when used in regard to sex work. While voluntary adult sex
work could easily be removed from the Criminal Code, some regulatory laws would need


1

Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, 3 SCR 1101 at para 1 [Bedford] See also paras 5,
61, 87, 89.
2
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 210, 212(1)(j), 213(1)(c) [Criminal Code].
3
Tonda MacCharles, “Peter MacKay rules out legalization, municipal regulation of prostitution”, Toronto
Star (20 January 2014), online:
<http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/01/20/peter_mackay_rules_out_legalization_municipal_regula
tion_of_prostitution.html> accessed 20 January 2014 [MacCharles]. These comments were made to the
media months prior to the introduction of Bill C-36 on June 4, 2014: Protection of Communities and
Exploited Persons Act, SC 2014, c 25 (assented to 6 November 2014) [C-36].








to adapt to ensure sex workers have access to the same rights and protections as other
workers. For example, in New Zealand, decriminalization meant the Health and Safety in
Employment Act was extended to encompass the sex trade.5 As a result, the Department
of Labour developed a comprehensive occupational health and safety guide designed to
provide clarity to the “duties, rights and responsibilities” of those in the industry.6
It also means leaving criminal laws in place that restrict the sex trade to adults and
prevent coercion or exploitation. This is the definition of decriminalization that will
inform the discussion that follows. As Maggie MacNeil explains, there is no such thing as
pure decriminalization:
neither [New Zealand nor New South Wales] has
absolute decriminalization because both have one or
two laws that don’t apply to other industries
(prohibiting those under 18 from working, for
example), but the number of such special restrictions is
so small as to make no practical difference for the vast
majority of sex workers.7
Even if a challenge to the new law were successful, the criminal law would remain
necessary, just in a different capacity. This thesis will argue that decriminalization, and
allowing municipal regulation is a preferred model to continued criminalization.



4

Barron’s Canadian Law Dictionary, 6th ed, sub verbo “decriminalize.”
Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 (NZ) 1992/96; New Zealand, Ministry of Justice, Report of
the Prostitution Law Review Committee on the Operation of the Prostitution Reform Act 2003 (Wellington:
Ministry of Justice, 2008) online: <http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy/commercial-property-andregulatory/prostitution/prostitution-law-review-committee/publications/plrc-report> accessed 30 January
2014 at 4.2.1 [PLRC Report].
6
Ibid; New Zealand, Department of Labour, Occupational Safety and Health Service, A Guide to
Occupational Health and Safety in the New Zealand Sex Industry (Wellington: Department of Labour,
2004) online: <http://www.business.govt.nz/worksafe/information-guidance/all-guidance-items/sexindustry-a-guide-to-occupational-health-and-safety-in-the-new-zealand/sexindustry.pdf>.
7
Maggie MacNeil, “Responses to Weitzer, Post, and Wagner: Don’t Be Swayed by Exaggerated Claims”,
The Conversation (11 December 2013), online: <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2013/12/11/maggiemcneill/responses-weitzer-post-wagner-dont-be-swayed-exaggerated-claims> accessed 9 February 2015.
5








While research clearly indicates the many benefits of decriminalizing sex work,
including enhanced safety8, better health9 and the extension of labour rights to benefit sex
workers10, the Federal Government has enacted new criminal law provisions that aim to
eliminate the sex trade.11 As these provisions moved through Parliament, there were calls
for them to be referred to the Supreme Court for an opinion on their constitutionality.12
Others pointed to constitutional weaknesses that could become part of a future court



8

Bedford, supra note 1 at para 63; Gillian Abel, Lisa Fitzgerald, & Cheryl Brunton, The Impact of the
Prostitution Reform Act on the Health and Safety Practices of Sex Workers (Christchurch: University of
Otago, 2007) online: <http://www.otago.ac.nz/christchurch/otago018607.pdf> at 133-4.
9
Global Commission on HIV, HIV and the Law: Risks, Rights & Health (New York: UNDP, HIV/AIDS
Group, 2012) online: <http://www.hivlawcommission.org/index.php/report> accessed 9 February 2015 at
45 [HIV & the Law]; Kate Shannon et al, “Global epidemiology of HIV among female sex workers:
influence of structural determinants” (2014) The Lancet, online: <
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(14)60931-4/abstract> accessed 9 February
2015.
10
Emily van der Meulen, “When Sex is Work: Organizing for Labour Rights and Protections” (2012) 69
Labour/Le Travail 147 at 152 [van der Meulen].
11
Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 2nd Sess, No 101 (11 June 2014) at 1700
(Hon. Peter MacKay).
12
Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence,
41st Parl, 2nd Sess, No 44 (15 July 2014) Hon. Françoise Boivin (Gatineau, NDP) at 09:30 and Hon. Sean
Casey (Charlottetown, Lib.) at 09:35, online: Parliament of Canada
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=6689198&Language=E&Mode=1&Par
l=41&Ses=2> accessed 9 February 2015; British Columbia, City of Vancouver & Vancouver Coastal
Health Authority, Position Paper on:
Bill C-36 the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act” (Ottawa: City of Vancouver and
Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, 2014 [Vancouver Brief].
13
Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, Brief to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and








challenge.13 Despite the fact that decriminalization, if it can be achieved, is still years
away, it is important to examine the implications now so that a potential transition from
the criminal law to municipal governance of the sex trade occurs smoothly.
This chapter will set the stage for a discussion of the next steps. Bedford was the
spark that reignited the debate about sex work regulation in Canada and detailing the
decision of the Supreme Court provides valuable context.14 The decision of the Court also
provides a lens through which to view the legislative response found in Bill C-36. The
provisions became law on December 6, 2014, before the Court’s declaration of invalidity
came into effect, with the result that there was no lapse in the criminal law governing sex
work.15 This chapter will also discuss the work position and detail the implications that
flow from that view. For many, it is difficult to think of sex work as a job. Parent and
Bruckert put forward the proposition that: “We suffer from tunnel vision in two senses:
on the one hand, we do not see the sexualized dimension in other jobs; on the other hand



13

Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, Brief to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and
Constitutional Affairs regarding Bill C-36, the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act
(Ottawa: Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, 2014), online:
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/412/lcjc/Briefs/C-36/C-36_brief_Cdn_HIV-AIDS_E.pdf>
accessed 17 September 2014; Providing Alternatives Counselling & Education (PACE) Society, Briefing
Note Bill C-36: An Act to amend the Criminal Code in response to the SCC decision in AG Canada v
Bedford, online: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/412/lcjc/Briefs/C-36/SM_C36_brief_PACE_Society_E.pdf> accessed 17 September 2014; Canada, Parliament, Senate, Standing
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Proceedings, 41st Parl, 2nd Sess, No 15 (9 September
2014) (Katrina Pacey), online: < http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/412/lcjc/15ev-51557e.htm?Language=E&Parl=41&Ses=2&comm_id=11> accessed 30 September 2014 [Pacey]; Canada,
Parliament, Senate, Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Proceedings, 41st Parl, 2nd
Sess, Issue 16 (17 September 2014) (Alan Young), online:
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/412/lcjc/16ev-51569e.htm?Language=E&Parl=41&Ses=2&comm_id=11> accessed 30 September 2014 [Young]; National
Criminal Justice Section and Municipal Law Section of the Canadian Bar Association, Bill C-36,
Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 2014), online:
<http://www.cba.org/CBA/submissions/pdf/14-57-eng.pdf> accessed 9 February 2015 [CBA Brief]
14
The Criminal provisions were previously subject to Supreme Court scrutiny in the Prostitution Reference
(Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1 (1)(C) of the Criminal Code (Man.) [1990] 1 SCR 1123, 77 CR (3d) 1). In
that instance the Court held that the bawdyhouse and communicating provisions were constitutional.
15
C-36, supra note 3 ; Bedford, supra note 1 at 169.








we see sex work only through the prism of sexuality”.16 The work position looks beyond
the sexualized nature of the job to better examine the labour involved.17 The work
position demonstrates the commonalities that sex work has with other professions thus
making it easier to think critically about the advantages of using regulatory laws instead
of criminal prohibitions. These three items are critical for understanding the current state
of the law, the potential problems with the federal response, and why the debate over how
to best regulate sex work in Canada will continue. The synopsis of the case and the
Federal Government’s response are provided for context of the legal and political
environments in which these decisions are being made. The work position will provide a
means of moving the conversation forward in light of the potential failings in the new
criminal provisions.18

BEDFORD V CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL)

In Bedford, the Supreme Court struck down three Criminal Code provisions under
section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.19 Although dangerous, selling sex was
legal until the enactment of Bill C-36.20 The Court in Bedford concluded that the
prohibitions on bawdy-houses, living on the avails and communicating for the purposes
of prostitution, prevented sex workers “from taking steps to protect themselves from the



16

Colette Parent & Chris Bruckert, “The Current Debate on Sex Work” in Colette Parent et al, eds, Sex
Work: Rethinking the Job, Respecting the Workers (Toronto: UBC Press, 2013) 9 at 24 [Parent &
Bruckert].
17
Ibid.
18
See note 13.
19
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (UK), c 11, s 7: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”
20
Bedford, supra note 1 at para 1; See also Ibid at paras 5, 60, 61, 87, 89.








risks” of violence.21 The Attorney General had argued that it was not the law but the
choice to engage in sex work that caused the harms but the Court rejected this premise for
three reasons.
First, the Court concluded that the most marginalized workers face “financial
desperation, drug addictions, mental illness, or compulsion from pimps, [and] they often
have little choice”.22 Second, those who choose to sell sex are engaging in a legal
activity.23 Third, the Court reiterated that the application was not launched to compel the
government to make sex work safer; it was to “strike down legislative provisions that
aggravate the risk of disease, violence and death”.24
The bawdy-house provision made it an offence to sell sex from a “fixed indoor
location”.25 The Court noted that sex work was limited to “street prostitution and outcalls – where the prostitute goes out and meets the client at a designated location, such as
the client’s home”.26 The Court agreed with the application judge’s determination that
“indoor work is far less dangerous than street prostitution” and that “out-call work is not
as safe as in-call work”.27 Writing for the Court, McLachlin CJC determined the bawdyhouse provision denied sex workers the ability to protect themselves in three ways: first,
by preventing sex work from occurring in a “fixed indoor location” - the prohibitions on
hiring staff compounded this insecurity; second, by making health services harder to
access and; third, by denying access to safe house brothels.28 When the effects of the
provision were balanced against the purpose of preventing “community harms in the


21

Ibid at para 60; See also Ibid at para 18.
Ibid at para 86.
23
Ibid at para 87.
24
Ibid at para 88.
25
Criminal Code, supra note 2, s 210; Bedford, supra note 1 at para 64.
26
Ibid at paras 5, 62.
27
Ibid at para 63.
22








nature of nuisance”29, the Court held that “the negative impact of the bawdy-house
provision on the applicants security of the person is grossly disproportionate”.30 The
Court found the provision prohibiting living on the avails was overbroad because in
addition to capturing exploitive relationships, it also prevented sex workers from
remunerating others who could help protect them against violence and exploitation.31 The
law prohibited sex workers from hiring receptionists, drivers or bodyguards who could
make their work safer. Even the “judicial restrictions” developed in Shaw32 and Grilo33,
which added exclusions for those providing goods and services, and for those living with
sex workers, were insufficient. The Court also rejected the Ontario Court of Appeal’s
reading in of “in circumstances of exploitation” as an appropriate solution.34 McLachlin
CJC wrote that narrowing the provision was problematic because it may “create
evidentiary difficulties” leading some to escape culpability for exploitation.35
The prohibition on communicating in public for the purposes of prostitution
“significantly increased the risks” of street based sex work.36 The Court concurred with
the application judge that “face to face communication is an essential tool in enhancing
street prostitutes’ safety” and that the provision displaced and dispersed sex workers into
more isolated areas, further increasing the danger of the trade.37 The objective of the
communicating provision was to “prevent the nuisances that street prostitution can


28

Ibid at para 64.
Ibid at para 131.
30
Ibid at para 134; Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice: Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2012) at 149. Due to the fact that a finding of gross disproportionality
is a high standard to meet, the Supreme Court had yet to overturn a law on this basis under s. 7 prior to
Bedford.
31
Bedford, supra note 1 at para 66.
32
Shaw v Director of Public Prosecutions, [1961] UKHL 1, [1962] AC 220 (HL).
33
R v Grilo (1991) 2 OR (3d) 514, 64 CCC (3d) 53.
34
Bedford, supra note 1 at para 143.
35
Ibid.
29








cause”.38 The Court held that the increased risk to sex workers was grossly
disproportionate to the goal of preventing “neighbourhood disruption”.39
Individually, and as a regime, these provisions created an environment in which
sex work became more dangerous because the laws denied workers the ability to take
safety precautions. The Court recognized that “[t]he regulation of prostitution is a
complex and delicate matter. It will be for Parliament, should it choose to do so, to devise
a new approach, reflecting different elements of the existing regime”.40 The Court
granted the Federal Government one year to enact new legislation before the declaration
of invalidity took effect.41
Ultimately, Parliament could have chosen not to draft new legislation. The effect
of such a decision would have allowed for municipal regulation as brothels. The Federal
Government indicated almost immediately that they would introduce new criminal
legislation so that consensual adult sex work would not become decriminalized.42 The
Supreme Court was clear new legislation would need to be carefully drafted to ensure
that the objectives and the effects did not violate the Charter rights of sex workers.43
Unfortunately, the new provisions were rushed through Parliament and the Senate with



36

Ibid at para 71.
Ibid at paras 69-70.
38
Ibid at para 147.
39
Ibid at 146, 159.
40
Ibid at para 165.
41
Ibid at para 169.
42
Canada, Department of Justice, Statement by the Minister of Justice Regarding the Supreme Court of
Canada Ruling in Attorney General of Canada V. Bedford et al. (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2013)
online:
<http://news.gc.ca/web/articleen.do?crtr.sj1D=&crtr.mnthndVl=12&mthd=advSrch&crtr.dpt1D=6681&nid
=804609&crtr.lc1D=&crtr.tp1D=1&crtr.yrStrtVl=2008&crtr.kw=&crtr.dyStrtVl=26&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mn
thStrtVl=2&crtr.page=6&crtr.yrndVl=2015&crtr.dyndVl=31> accessed 20 December 2014.
43
Bedford, supra note 1 at para 5.
37








little meaningful consultation resulting in a new criminal regime that largely replicates
the harms of its predecessor.44

THE PROTECTION OF COMMUNITIES AND EXPLOITED PERSONS ACT
The Court gave the Federal Government one year to draft new legislation. 45 One
month later, Justice Minister Peter MacKay stated that new criminal legislation
controlling sex work would be introduced.46 This was one of the earliest indications from
the government that municipal regulation was not under consideration. On February 1st,
the Minister announced that the new bill was already being drafted,47 despite the fact that
a month-long, public consultation did not commence until February 17th.48
Bill C-36, entitled the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act was
introduced on June 4, 2014, and for the first time in Canadian history, a move had been
made to criminalize sex work.49 The new legislation aims to “denounce and prohibit


44

The legislative process is fully documented on the Parliament of Canada website including evidence
presented: Canada, Parliament, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, Bill C-36, online:
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Bill=C36&Parl=41&Ses=2>.
45
Ibid at para 169.
46
The Canadian Press, “New prostitution bill expected 'well before' deadline, Peter MacKay says”, CBC
News (1 February 2014), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-prostitution-bill-expected-wellbefore-deadline-peter-mackay-says-1.2520073?cmp=rss>.
47
Ibid.
48
Canada, Department of Justice, Public input to inform government’s response to Supreme Court of
Canada’s decision on prostitution” (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2014) online:
<http://news.gc.ca/web/articleen.do?crtr.sj1D=&crtr.mnthndVl=12&mthd=advSrch&crtr.dpt1D=6681&nid=815959&crtr.lc1D=&crtr.tp1
D=1&crtr.yrStrtVl=2008&crtr.kw=&crtr.dyStrtVl=26&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVl=2&crtr.page=3&crtr.
yrndVl=2015&crtr.dyndVl=31> accessed 9 February 2015. In March, the Justice Minister indicated that all
suggestions were being considered despite having said a month earlier that the law was already being
drafted. See John Ivison, “Flawed report could be basis for Tories’ new prostitution law”, National Post (20
March 2014), online:
<http://ww2.nationalpost.com/m/wp/blog.html?b=fullcomment.nationalpost.com%2F2014%2F03%2F20%
2Fjohn-ivison-flawed-report-could-be-basis-for-tories-new-prostitution-law>.
49
Young, supra note 11; CBA Brief, supra note 11; Susana Mas, “Prostitution bill would make it illegal to
buy, sell sex in public”, CBC News (4 June 2014), online: < http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/prostitutionbill-would-make-it-illegal-to-buy-sell-sex-in-public-1.2664683>.








demand for prostitution”.50 This is counter to the findings of the three major governmentcommissioned reports which concluded: “repression, far from doing away with
prostitution, creates conditions that interfere with this objective by pushing the most
vulnerable people to sell sexual services under ever-riskier conditions”.51
Instead of allowing sex workers the ability to protect themselves, the preamble of
the Act reduces sex workers to victims by labeling the sex trade as “inherently”
exploitative and violent, and by labeling “prostitution” as an affront to “human dignity”
that ought to be discouraged.52 Patrice Corriveau, a criminology professor at the
University of Ottawa, describes this type of regulation as “paternalistic and
infantilizing”.53 The Act goes on to introduce criminal prohibitions for the purchasing of
sexual services54, advertising sexual services55 and to recriminalize communication in
public places.56 Canada’s new law classifies sex workers as “victims of sexual
exploitation” while also anticipating that sex workers will “report incidents of violence”
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Canada, Department of Justice, Technical Paper: Bill C-36, An Act to amend the Criminal Code in
response to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Attorney General of Canada v. Bedford and to make
consequential amendments to other Acts (Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act) (Ottawa;
Department of Justice, 2014) online: < http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/other-autre/protect/protect.pdf>
accessed 15 December 2014 [DOJ Technical Paper].
51
Patrice Corriveau, “Regulating Sex Work” in Colette Parent et al, eds, Sex Work: Rethinking the Job,
Respecting the Workers (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013) at 39 [Corriveau]. The three reports are: Canada,
Department of Justice, Report of the Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution, Volume 2
(Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1985); Federal/Provincial/Territorial Working Group on Prostitution,
Report and recommendations in respect of legislation, policy and practices concerning prostitution related
activities (Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services, 1998); Canada, Parliament, House of Commons,
Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, The Challenge of Change: A Study of Canada’s
Criminal Prostitution Laws (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 2006) [Challenge of
Change].
52
C-36, supra note 3, at preamble.
53
Corriveau, supra note 51 at 39.
54
C-36, supra note 3, s 286.1.
55
Ibid at s 286.4.
56
Ibid at s 213 (1.1).








or exit the sex trade entirely.57 While the (purported) intent is new, the problems created
by the provisions remain the same.
Even before Bill C-36 became law, questions were being raised about the
constitutionality of the new provisions it introduced.58 A full constitutional analysis is
beyond the scope of this project. However, I will briefly draw attention to some of the
arguments that are being made about the constitutionality of the new criminal regime to
underscore why it is important consider the municipal regulation of sex work, even in the
face of new criminal provisions. This section will highlight the issues raised by the
provisions prohibiting receiving sexual services for consideration and communicating. It
will also examine the difficulties that may be created for municipalities that license adult
service providers in the face of the commercial enterprise clause in s.286.2 (5)(e).59 The
intense questioning of the Federal Government’s response to Bedford indicates that the
conversation about how to regulate sex work in Canada has not yet concluded.

CRIMINALIZING CLIENTS

The sale of sex by consenting adults remains legal, but receiving sexual services
for consideration is now prohibited.60 This type of asymmetrical criminalization was first
introduced in Sweden in 1999 in the Sex Purchase Act.61 Both the Swedish government,



57

Ibid at Preamble.
See note 13.
59
C-36, supra note 3 at s 286.2(5)(e).
60
Ibid at s 286.1
61
Sex Purchase Act, Sweden 1999. (Government offices of Sweden, Legislation on the Purchase of Sexual
Services, Last updated January 5, 2015, online: <www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/4096/a/119861> accessed 9
February 2015 [Sex Purchase Act Summary].
58








and now the Canadian government cited the objective of ending demand for sexual
services in support of asymmetrical criminalization.62
The Bedford Court was clear that the safest way to sell sex was from a fixed
indoor location.63 While the Department of Justice has stated that sex workers will not be
precluded from working from fixed indoor locations64, the reality is that prohibitions on
purchasing and advertising will make this incredibly difficult.65 While the new legislative
objectives propose “to protect human dignity and the equality of all Canadians by
discouraging prostitution”66, Bedford lawyer Alan Young and the Canadian Bar
Association have raised questions of gross disproportionality, overbreadth and
arbitrariness.67 Although Young concedes that it will take time to amass the necessary
evidence on the effects of the provision, he asserted that: “[t]he law has to achieve its
goal. Well, if we find out in five years that everyone’s been pushed out to the street
because the johns won’t come indoors, then it’s an arbitrary law that undercuts its very
purpose”.68
While the evidence will take time to gather, an evidentiary basis for the harms of
criminalizing the clients of sex workers is already growing. The UN Commission on HIV


62

C-36, supra note 3 at preamble; Sex Purchase Act Summary, supra note 58; DOJ Technical Paper, supra
note 47.
63
Bedford, supra note 1 at para 63; Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General) 2010 ONSC 4264, 102 OR (3d)
321 at para 300.
64
Canada, Parliament, Senate, Standing Committee on
Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Proceedings, 41st Parl, 2nd Sess, No 15 (9 September 2014) (Nathalie
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and the Law found that the adoption of the Swedish law, both in Sweden and elsewhere
“has resulted in grave consequences for the workers”.69 Their report details the harms of
criminalization:
police harassment and violence push sex work
underground, where it is harder to negotiate safer
conditions and consistent condom use, […] rape and
assault are difficult to report, […] sexual violence
heightens exposure to HIV, […] and working in the
informal sector reduces sex workers’ access to
education and housing, thus increasing their
dependence on others, including pimps.70
The research of Sandra Ka Hon Chu and Rebecca Glass found client-targeted policing
creates similar harms to sex workers being criminalized by provisions prohibiting
communicating.71 Under the new law, communicating remains largely prohibited as well
and is examined in detail below. Should these harms become reality in the wake of
Canada’s decision to criminalize the clients of sex workers, the Supreme Court could be
required to once again weigh in.

COMMUNICATING

The new communicating provision found in s. 213(1.1) raises issues similar to the
ones that caused the Bedford Court to strike down its predecessor.72 Beyond a new
legislative intent, the new provision is different in that it explicitly targets sex workers
(and potentially third parties) by prohibiting communication “for the purpose of offering
or providing sexual services” and that it limits the prohibited communication to “a public
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place, or in any place open to public view, that is next to a school ground, playground or
daycare centre”.73 Communication by clients for obtaining sexual services, regardless of
location, remains prohibited but is now captured under s. 286.1(1).74 While the words
have changed, the effects remain the same: “the law on communicating would not be
substantially different from what the law was before Bedford in its impact on sex
workers’ right of prosecution for communicating with their clients”.75 The Canadian Bar
Association found that “this section seems to suffer from arbitrariness and gross
disproportionality”.76
While the government asserted that the goal was to immunize sex workers from
prosecution77, the revised communicating provisions shows that they can still be charged
with an offence. Pivot Executive director, Katrina Pacey, who also acted as an intervener
in Bedford, told the Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs that
maintaining the communicating law “will continue to displace marginalized street-based
workers to dangerous locations, give them little time to negotiate or screen clients and
will place them at odds with the police”.78 The Bedford Court could not have articulated
the importance of screening more clearly than when McLachlin CJC wrote: “if screening
could have prevented one woman from jumping into Robert Pickton’s car, the severity of
the harmful effects is established”.79 While the law does not technically prohibit sex
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workers from screening their clients, the criminalization of clients will impact how and
where they interact. As Young told the Senate committee, “sex workers will once again
be forced to work in most dangerous of forums, on the streets”.80

COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISE – CONSIDERATIONS FOR MUNICIPAL LAW

The living on the avails provision struck down in Bedford has been replaced by a
prohibition on “receiving a material benefit”.81 The intent of the Court, in striking down
the previous provision, was that sex workers should not be precluded from hiring those
who could make their work safer.82 The material benefit provision makes a number of
exceptions, including those in “legitimate living arrangements”83, those who benefit as a
result of a “legal or moral obligation”84 (ie. dependents), those who provide goods or
services to the public on the same conditions85 (ie. a landlord or an accountant), and those
who provide services specifically for sex workers, so long as they have in no way
encouraged the provision of sexual services from which the material benefit is derived.86
This permits sex workers to hire security, drivers and receptionists, so long as they are
paid proportionately for their services.87 However, there is no guidance as to how
remuneration will be determined to be proportionate, which means compliance is difficult
to conclude, and ultimately left to the courts.
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The potential issue for municipalities is that the provision introduces a prohibition
on receiving a material benefit in the context of a “commercial enterprise”.88 A definition
of what constitutes a commercial enterprise is not provided.89 Instead, the Department of
Justice states: “Courts would likely take into account considerations such as the number
of persons involved, the duration of the activities and the level of organization
surrounding the activities”.90 While explicitly stating that this section is not intended to
criminalize the earnings of sex workers working “independently or cooperatively”, it
leaves it to the courts to determine if the nuances of the organization of their work,
“including informal ones” rises to the level of a commercial enterprise.91 The new
material benefit provision, as part of a larger regime, aims to prevent the
“institutionalization of prostitution through commercial enterprises, such as strip clubs,
massage parlours and escort agencies in which prostitution takes place”.92 This could
have serious impacts on businesses that are already operating and licensed by
municipalities.
The Canadian Bar Association submitted that the material benefit clauses are
likely unconstitutional because they: “undermine the ability of prostitutes to work
indoors; prohibit prostitutes from benefiting from non-exploitive relationships which are
vital to ensuring their safety, and prohibit prostitutes from taking advantage of the
benefits associated with organized forms of prostitution”.93 While the bawdy-house
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provision no longer exists, sex workers are left without the ability to operate in any
organized manner for fear of criminal charges, even when no exploitation occurs.94
While the title of the Act indicates that communities are a priority, no consultation
with cities occurred during the creation of the provisions.95 The City of Vancouver
explicitly asked the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human
Rights to consult with municipalities, as well as provincial health authorities.96 In
response to the passing of the bill, Vancouver issued a statement indicating that their
priority continues to be the “health and safety of sex workers and the communities that
they live and work [in]”.97 The statement makes it clear that the city will not be
abandoning previous commitments to harm reduction strategies.98
The CBA found that the new criminal provisions throw municipal licensing and
zoning of adult services into “uncertainty”.99 The CBA is of the opinion that cities should
have been given the opportunity to discuss the new law before it was passed because
“municipalities have jurisdiction over zoning and business licensing, and an important
role in mitigating neighbourhood impacts through effective law enforcement”.100 The
new criminal law regime, with all of its uncertainties creates an environment where
lawyers will have trouble providing “clear legal advice, which is damaging to municipal
governments and the communities they serve”.101
The passing of Bill C-36 is already raising concerns in Edmonton where a task
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force has been studying the city’s massage parlours.102 Councilor and task force member,
Scott McKeen said: “[w]hile the task force may make recommendations to improve the
safety of sex trade workers, the new laws might tie the city’s hands”.103 The city was
prepared to commit almost $300,000 to make the recommendations of the task force a
reality but that contribution is being reconsidered because of the new laws.104 One body
rub parlour owner and practitioner stated that plans to implement measures such as fire
plans, and industry-exit programs should still go ahead.105 The task force will have to
carefully tailor their recommendations so that they do not run afoul of the new laws but
still enhance the safety of workers. They may also have to move quickly to ensure that
the funds to implement the plans are still available.
Just as was the case with the former provisions, the new laws are intended to work
in tandem, but now the intent is to suppress the demand for paid sex.106 Even if this is a
laudable goal, it is likely unachievable:
Three consensuses already exist: first, on the need
to better protect female sex workers; second, on the
failure of the laws in force to do away with
“prostitution” and third, on the fact that the current
laws essentially harm female sex workers.107
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It is a summation of how the debate on regulating sex work finds there is much to debate
but little consensus. Despite the change in the law, this statement remains accurate. There
are two main positions in the debate over sex work regulation, created from a multitude
of groups and individuals who all take their position for different reasons. On one side,
there is the group which seeks to prohibit prostitution through criminal law. On the other,
a group which seeks a repeal of the criminal laws and extension of protections under
existing labour, human rights and business frameworks. This thesis advocates for the
latter. Laws, regulations, bylaws and policies, created in conjunction with sex workers are
the most effective solution available. By considering the municipal response now, cities
can best adapt to the changing legal landscapes. The best course of action is to develop a
clear understanding of the impacts of municipal bylaws on sex workers and how the
situation can be achieved. Given the chorus of voices who believe the regime is as
unconstitutional as the one struck down by the Court, there is every indication that
another constitutional challenge will be mounted. 

THE WORK POSITION
This discussion will frame sex work as work, and use the reasoning of the
Supreme Court, along with other resources, to provide direction for municipal lawmakers
who may not be comfortable or informed about the realities of sex work. Sex workers are
asking that their occupation be permitted to abide by the same labour regulations as any
other industry.108 While lawmakers may not understand the nuances of the sex trade,
they do understand how to regulate businesses. Both municipalities and sex workers have
specific expertise and if sex work is viewed as work then the conversation that results





 


could easily move towards how best to create a municipal licensing regime for
decriminalized brothels. Moving beyond morality and opinion is required if this is to
occur and this section will set out the importance of recognizing the work in sex work.
Looking past the associated stigma and treating sex work like any other job
allows the trade to be examined in a different light. When sex work is viewed as work,
the voices of the workers can be heard because the focus shifts from sex to work.109 As
Jeffery and MacDonald posit:
[b]y understanding sex work as a resistant form of
labour rather than simply as a survival mechanism,
we both see the lives of sex workers more clearly
from their perspective and make room for a politics
that includes them as agents of change rather than
objects of intervention.110
Sex workers speak in terms of work, not in terms of criminal behavior and municipalities
should respect this stance.
.
Classifying sex work as a crime is a matter of opinion. Removing it from the
Criminal Code does not mean leaving the industry lawless; it means imposing a different
set of rules. Using heavy-handed criminal prohibitions to control the sex trade only
creates more problems than it solves. As Brock explains, a crime-centric approach has
been repeatedly proven as ineffective:
legislators, the courts, and the police cannot make
prostitution disappear. All that can be done is to create
new patterns of enforcement that ultimately accomplish
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little except to make life more difficult for sex
workers.111
Decriminalizing voluntary adult sex work and allowing municipal licensing for brothels
ends the ineffectual criminalization. Framing sex work as work allows for a more focused
discussion as to how the bylaws should be written.
Sex workers do not all speak with the same voice: “[s]ome state that they enjoy
their work; others consider it a lesser evil or describe it as a very difficult experience”.112
This is simply because “there is no such thing as a representative sex worker”.113 As
Emily van der Meulen states: “Over simplistic anti-prostitution analyses that advocate for
the eradication of the sex industry thus tend to ignore the complex and multi-faceted
organization of labour within the sex industry as well as sex worker’ diverse experiences
working within it”.114 Whether a person sells sexual services for a lifetime, as an onagain, off-again job, or as a temporary solution, sex workers express opinions about their
work just like any other employee talks about work.115 Setting aside the stigma and
morality often associated with sex allows sex work to be examined as a job.
Just as sex workers vary, so do the working conditions. Street based sex workers
are the most prevalent image associated with sex work. In reality, street-based work only
encompasses approximately twenty percent of the industry.116 Street-based workers are
merely more visible, while the majority of the industry is unseen. Parent and Bruckert use
labour theory to examine sex work separately from the associated stigma: “[l]abour
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theory enables us to step outside of the traditional criminological analysis of deviance in
order to examine these jobs as jobs”.117 They found that working for a third party, as a
sex worker is similar to “many other service-sector workers”.118 Sex workers who work
for a third party are “managed like employees”. Like employees they are expected to
comply with scheduling, perform duties related to the business and adhere to the rules set
by management.119 In return, management may provide advertising, security, drivers and
reception. By looking through the labour lens where sex is removed from the equation, it
is clear that working for a third party in a massage parlour is not that different from a
hairdresser who works for a third party. Both would convey stories about clients they
liked or disliked, shifts they preferred, co-workers they liked or disliked, as well as
complaints and advantages of the employer.
There are expectations of service, knowledge and skill in both jobs: “[l]ike
waitresses, hair stylists, and sales clerks, sex workers have to be sociable, patient,
courteous, polite and capable of dealing with a variety of people”.120 Sex workers have a
host of other skills that would add up to an impressive resume – “money management,
communication and listening, conflict resolution, marketing and business administration,
assertiveness, and creativity” – but their skills are devalued because of the nature of their
work.121 Sex workers also must possess specific skills that relate to their work and these
may vary depending on which facet of the industry they work in. For example, an
independent escort may develop web design and social media skills to attract clients,
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where a worker employed by an agency may not need to. Even when highly skilled, sex
workers often have difficulty transferring these skills to other occupations.122
The labour lens allows for sex work to be treated and regulated like other
businesses. Sex workers state: “[c]onceptualizing sex work as a form of sexual labour
could lead to a social context where sex industry establishments are more likely to abide
by labour legislation”.123 In fact, this is supported by the comparison of “social control”
and “neutral” licensing models in Chapters 3 and 4.124 The language shift that occurs
when sex work is considered labour gives sex workers greater legitimacy because there is
a forum for dealing with occupational health and safety issues, like safer sex and
violence.125 Instead of being “blinded by moralism”126, the labour position “is based on a
recognition of the need for broad social rights for all”.127
The main advantage in working for a third party is that not everyone is capable of
or interested in being an entrepreneur.128 While it may be difficult for many people to put
themselves in the shoes of a sex worker, everyone – sex workers included – could name
at least one job they would never want to do. Classing a profession as undesirable is not a
sufficient reason for devaluing it.
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FROM THE CRIMINAL CODE TO THE MUNICIPAL CODE

The criminal law is “the most powerful tool at Parliament’s disposal”.129
However, Binnie J. also reminds us that the criminal law is a “blunt instrument”.130 The
Criminal Code is not the best tool available for regulating sex work.131 The main
argument this thesis will advance is that the proper place for regulating brothels is at the
municipal level because municipalities are already licensing businesses that provide adult
services and because they are in the best position to adopt local solutions. This is not to
suggest that the current licensing regimes for other adult services should be replicated
and applied to license brothels. They merely represent a starting point.
The Constitution Act, 1867, places municipalities under provincial jurisdiction.132
This limits the authority of municipalities to the powers that are “expressly delegated in
provincial legislation”133 and places strict parameters on what actions cities are permitted
to take. Chapter 2 will explore the limits of municipal authority and how cities are using
their authority to license adult services such as escort services and massage parlours. This
discussion will also highlight how cities license adult workers and then turn a blind eye to
the difficulties that workers face by being caught between the legitimacy of municipal
licensing and having their work prohibited by the Criminal Code. This chapter will argue
that municipal licensing is the best option for decriminalized brothels but that the current
licensing regimes will not be adequate.
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After establishing that municipalities have the requisite authority and experience
to regulate brothels, the discussion will turn to the best practices for doing so. Chapter 3
will explore the benefits and drawbacks of the current licensing regimes for adult
businesses. While workers have said that holding a license increases the legitimacy of
their employment to allow them the benefits of verifiable employment 134, offers
improved health and safety135 and has contributed to programming for adult workers136,
these benefits come at a significant cost. Workers cite onerous conditions for obtaining a
license137, privacy concerns138 and the expense as drawbacks to licensing.139 The
effectiveness of licensing regimes is also impacted by the goals it seeks to achieve.140 The
discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of Canadian licensing regimes will be
undertaken with a view to the “social control” model of licensing. The social control
model demonstrates that a license to operate does not necessarily equate with approval.141
This adds depth to the discussion by showing how the approach to licensing can replicate
the conditions of criminalization, thus negating potential benefits.
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In chapter four, I will discuss how consideration of the experience of
decriminalization in New Zealand can advance our understanding of both municipally
controlled brothels and decriminalized sex work. With the passing of the Prostitution
Reform Act (PRA) in 2003, New Zealand became the first country in the world to
decriminalize voluntary adult sex work both indoors and out.142 This chapter will begin
with a brief overview of the New Zealand Act to establish how Territorial Authorities
became responsible for the regulation of brothels. It will then examine the types of
licensing bylaws that they have enacted. Research, including the Report of the
Prostitution Law Reform Committee143, as well as reports of the experiences of workers
will highlight how municipalities have been successful in incorporating brothels into
municipal regimes with a view to benefiting sex workers. In contrast to the “social
control” model which underlies Canada’s licensing regimes, New Zealand has adopted a
“neutral” stance to licensing.144 Consideration of the New Zealand model will assist in
developing the guiding principles that should be considered when creating a licensing
regime.
Using current Canadian licensing regimes for adult service businesses as a
starting point and drawing from research conducted with sex workers, the Bedford
decision, and from New Zealand, this thesis will provide municipal lawmakers with the
guidance necessary to develop fair and effective licensing bylaws. Chapter five offers
municipalities a basic framework to avoid the problems that exist in the current municipal
regimes licensing adult work, and to ensure that workers benefit from licensing. Although
the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act is now law, the speculation
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around the constitutionality of the new provisions shows the need for municipal
lawmakers to be prepared to address decriminalized sex work.145 This thesis proposes
recommendations regarding: reasonable fees, exemptions from licensing, ensuring those
with past convictions for prostitution related offences are not precluded from obtaining
licenses, protection of the privacy of workers, and consultation with those in the industry
to create the details of licensing regimes. Consultation is critical as “[s]ex workers are in
the best position to describe what it is like to work and live under the current social and
legal framework” and to recommend the ways in which circumstances should be
improved.146 In addition, to attain maximum benefits to workers and compliance with the
licensing regime, these recommendations should be undertaken in conjunction with a
“neutral” stance on licensing.147

CONCLUSION

The debate over how sex work should be regulated remains unsettled. With the
striking down of the former provisions and the questionable constitutionality of the
provisions designed to replace them, there is ample room for a discussion of alternative
measures. This paper presents municipal regulation as the solution to balance the interests
of both sex workers and communities. The chapters that follow will establish that
municipalities have the requisite authority, the experience in creating licensing regimes
and that benefits can flow to both cities and sex workers if the regimes are developed in
consultation with workers. The guidance from sex workers who sell sex in criminalized
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and decriminalized countries lends considerable insight into what licensing regimes need
to address so that sex workers can work safely and reap the benefits those in all other
occupations take for granted.
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CHAPTER 2 – MUNICIPALITIES CAN REGULATE
DECRIMINALIZED BROTHELS

INTRODUCTION
Evidence has repeatedly shown that the safest way to sell sex is from a “fixed
indoor location”.1 The Bedford decision affirmed that laws aimed at maintaining orderly
streets cannot do so at the expense of the health, safety and security of sex workers.2 This
must be taken into consideration when constructing municipal regimes to license sex
work.3 The new legislation introduced by the Federal Government in response to Bedford
leaves little room for decriminalized brothels but it remains to be seen if this legislation
will withstand constitutional scrutiny.4
In this chapter, I advance the proposition that municipal governments are in the
best position to regulate decriminalized brothels using licensing regimes because cities
are already licensing adult businesses that are closely aligned with the sex trade.5 To set
up this discussion, I will provide an overview of municipal authority and the current
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bylaws that license escort services and body rub parlours.6 After establishing how the
adult services industry is licensed, the discussion will move to highlight how cities are
already licensing sex work within the businesses that purport to be offering
companionship and massage, and the complications that are caused for workers who are
licensed municipally but criminalized under federal laws. This chapter will argue that
instead of being forced to pretend that sex work is not occurring through these channels,
cities should develop licensing regimes specifically for brothels to alleviate legal
concerns, denial of adequate health and safety measures and to facilitate better
relationships with enforcement officers, which represent the most frequent concerns of
workers.7
This chapter will highlight how cities have turned a blind eye to sex work that is
occurring in municipally licensed adult service businesses,8 while at the same time
drafting bylaws that appear to contemplate the exchange of sex for money.9 While
licensed by cities, owners and workers in the adult industry are burdened by the federal
criminal provisions on prostitution: workers struggle from a lack of information;10 they
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are confused that cities are allowed to profit from license fees while the criminal law (as
it then was) prohibits living on the avails; and relationships with enforcement officers are
strained.11 This chapter will underscore not only that municipalities are capable of
licensing sex work, but also that licensing regimes could work more effectively with the
repeal of the criminal provisions.

THE LIMITS OF MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY

In 1839, Lord Durham advanced the argument that local governments were in the
best position to serve local needs and that if municipalities were not recognized in the
constitution as a formal level of government from the outset, other levels of government
would never relinquish control.12 The Constitution Act, 1867 did not entrench
municipalities as a separate order of government. Instead, municipalities were placed
under provincial jurisdiction.13 This limits the authority of municipalities to the powers
that are “expressly delegated in provincial legislation”.14 It places strict parameters on
what actions cities are permitted to take, as they are powerless save for the authority
granted by the province.
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The actions of municipalities must also be Charter compliant.15 The Supreme
Court reaffirmed this principle in R v Guignard stating: “[a]part from the legislative
framework and the general principles of administrative law that apply to them, municipal
powers must be exercised in accordance with the principles of the Charter, as must all
government powers”.16
Each province and territory sets the boundaries of municipal authority through
delegating legislation.17 Municipalities have only the powers that are granted through
legislation, usually in the form of a municipal act or a city charter.18 For example, the
Nova Scotia Municipal Government Act confers “broad authority” to municipalities to:
“provide good government; provide services, facilities and other things that, in the
opinion of the council, are necessary or desirable for all or part of the municipality, and
develop and maintain safe and viable communities”.19 Not unlike constitutions, municipal
delegating legislation needs to be anticipatory because “the precise powers a municipality
may require cannot be known in advance”.20 While the powers of municipalities have the
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ability to adapt as needs arise, cities must be cautious not to legislate in contradiction to
provincial statutes or venture into powers granted to the Federal Government.21
Although municipalities are limited by the “express authority doctrine”22, “the
rule against delegation”23, and “provincial paramountcy”24, a gradual shift began in
Greenbaum25 that would move municipalities from being considered merely
“administrators of provincial authority”26 to acknowledging that municipal politicians are
accountable to the electorate to represent local interests. Writing for the court in
Greenbaum, Iacobucci J. determined that while it is important for courts to “be vigilant in
ensuring that municipalities do not impinge upon the civil or common law rights of
citizens in passing ultra vires by-laws”,27 where there is more than one possible
interpretation of a by-law, it should be “read to fit within the parameters of the
empowering provincial statute”.28 This balancing act recognizes the authority of
municipalities who are governed by elected officials but ensures that they do not act
outside of their jurisdiction.
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When a court has determined that a municipality has acted within its delegated
authority, their enactments are evaluated “upon a deferential standard”29, a long-standing
principle that was first articulated in Kruse v. Johnson.30 In this case, a dispute over a
bylaw prohibiting music in residential areas, Lord Russell stated:
A byelaw (sic) is not unreasonable merely because
particular judges may think that it goes further than
is prudent or necessary or convenient, or because it
is not accompanied by a qualification or exception
which some judges may think ought to be there. Surely
it is not too much to say that in matters which directly
and mainly concern the people of the country, who
have the right to choose whom they think best to
represent them in their local government bodies, such
representatives may be trusted to understand their own
requirements better than judges.31
The modern restatement of this principle is expressed in Shell Canada Products
Ltd. v. Vancouver (City), where McLachlin J. (as she then was) writing in dissent,
advocated for “a broader more deferential approach” when undertaking judicial review of
municipal enactments.32 She stated:
Barring clear demonstration that a municipal decision
was beyond its powers, courts should not so hold. In
cases where powers are not expressly conferred but
may be implied, courts must be prepared to adopt the
"benevolent construction" which this Court referred to
in Greenbaum, and confer the powers by reasonable
implication. Whatever rules of construction are applied,
they must not be used to usurp the legitimate role of
municipal bodies as community representatives.33
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Sopinka J., took a more narrow approach to resolve the issue in Shell.34 However, in
Spraytech35, the Court was again asked to determine the appropriate standard of
deference to municipal decision-making. The majority recognized the principle of
“subsidiarity”. L’Heureux-Dubé J., explained the concept as:
the proposition that law-making and
implementation are often best achieved at a
level of government that is not only effective,
but also closest to the citizens affected and thus
most responsive to their needs, to local distinctiveness,
and to population diversity”.36
With this principle underlying the approach of the courts, it becomes clear that courts are
hesitant to overturn municipal enactments that are within its legislative authority because
they represent local interests.

MORALITY IN BYLAWS – A CRIMINAL INTENT OR A LICENSING REGIME
The waters become somewhat muddy when provisions that appear to be wading
into federal powers appear in licensing regimes. While the courts have been clear that
cities cannot directly combat sex work because it is a criminal law matter37, licensing
schemes for adult industries often contain provisions and rules that, on their face, seem to
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evoke morality. Within the confines of a licensing regime, issues that might otherwise be
considered morality-based, such as provisions that prohibit nudity, become permissible.
In Morrison,38 the court was clear that “matters of morality are generally dealt
with by the Parliament of the Dominion”.39 The Supreme Court’s ruling in Westendorp
confirmed that bylaws that aimed at “establishing or enforcing public morality” would be
found ultra vires.40 Within the confines of a licensing regime, the courts have appeared to
be more lenient when bylaws contain a “moral aspect”.41 In Re Try-San International
Ltd., the owners of a body-rub parlour and a model studio challenged amendments made
to the Vancouver licensing bylaw.42 They argued that the city was attempting to regulate
morality by adding provisions to the by-law that restrict the hours of operation and
prohibit body-rub attendants from working nude.43 The British Columbia Court of Appeal
upheld the bylaw because they had not been presented with evidence indicating that
morality was a factor in the changes to the licensing bylaw.44
In McNeil, the Supreme Court clarified the difference between the Criminal Code
and a provincial act that regulated business (in this instance, theatres): “one is directed to
regulating a trade or business where the other is concerned with the definition and
punishment of crime; and in the second place, one is preventive while the other is
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penal”.45 The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in Rio Hotel using similar reasoning.46
Dickson CJ. distinguished Rio Hotel from Westendorp and found no intrusion into federal
domain.47 In concurring reasons, Estey J. wrote:
[w]here the program is founded on a licensing system
with regulations and conditions related to the provision
of a licence, and where the province does not purport to
establish an offence that is criminal in character, it is
clearly constitutionally legitimate.48
The courts have seemingly drawn a line in the sand that allows for the inclusion of
restrictions that may be considered morality based so long as the objective is sufficiently
tailored to facilitating a licensing regime and no conflict with federal law is created.

CURRENT LICENSING BYLAWS REGULATING ADULT BUSINESSES
The authority to create business licensing regimes is under the jurisdiction of
municipalities because the regimes are aimed at controlling business and not controlling
prostitution.49 Each city creates its own licensing requirements which means that the
licensing requirements can vary greatly by city and according to the sector of the adult
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industry that is being licensed. One city may require escorts to be licensed, while another
may not. A recent study found that massage parlours are likely to be required to have a
municipal license to operate.50 The study included 55 managers of sex industry
businesses, of which 47% held a municipal license.51 A majority of those who were
unlicensed were not required to have a license (64%), while others preferred operating
without a license (22%) because of privacy.52 The piecemeal approach means that there is
no universal licensing scheme and it falls to owners and workers to determine what
license is needed and how to meet the conditions to acquire it.
Even though the current municipal licensing regulations are inconsistent, they
demonstrate that municipalities have the authority and competence to create such regimes
for adult service providers. The discussion that follows shows that while the current
licensing regimes are imperfect, and their effectiveness is hampered by the criminal law,
that municipalities, given the opportunity to openly discuss licensing brothels, could
enact better licensing bylaws. This section will detail escort licensing in Vancouver and
the licensing of body rub parlours in Toronto as examples of licensing bylaws.
With over 2.4 million residents, Vancouver is Canada’s third largest city.53 Sex
work in Vancouver has been well documented from the opening of the first brothel in
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1867.54 It is estimated that there are between 1500 and 2000 people working in
Vancouver’s sex trade.55 Toronto is Canada’s largest city, and with a population fast
approaching the three million mark, the fourth largest in North America.56 There are no
reliable estimates on how many are working within the city’s sex trade but there seems to
be no shortage of talk about the trade and how it should be managed.57 This allows for
insight into both the object and the effect of the bylaws, which is critical for developing
recommendations for future regulation.

VANCOUVER’S SOCIAL ESCORTS
Just as with any other business, the operators of escort agencies in Vancouver are
required to obtain a business license from the city.58 The Licensing bylaw59 covers all
businesses in Vancouver but details the specific requirements for each type. A social
escort is defined as: “any person who, for a fee or other form of payment, escorts or
accompanies another person, but does not mean a person providing assistance to another
person because of that person’s age or handicap”.60 A license for a social escort agency
allows an operator to carry on “the business of providing, or offering to provide, the
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services or the names of persons to act as escorts for other persons”.61 The bylaw sets out
the requirements for applying for and maintaining a license, including: keeping the city
informed of all names used for operations and advertising62, age requirements for those
employed63, license requirements for employees64, and providing city staff with a detailed
list of staff, and informing the city of any changes to the provided list within 24 hours.65
Those seeking a license must apply in person and submit to a criminal record check.66 A
license can be denied on the basis of the criminal record check and may prevent those
with previous prostitution convictions from obtaining a license.67
In July 1988, Vancouver updated the social escort section of the licensing
bylaw.68 The expanded section added the condition that “an operator, or a licensee or
employee shall be present on the premises” during business hours.69 This effectively
prohibits an escort from operating independently. The update also changed the record
keeping requirements. The former bylaw compelled a written record of all inquiries for
services, including the client’s name and address, as well as the name of the service
provider and the event to be attended.70 The amendment required that the fee charged for
the service also be recorded. Under the amended bylaw, business records must be
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produced for police review upon request.71 Fines and penalties greater than $1000 can be
imposed for non-compliance.72
International Escort Services Inc. challenged the record keeping provision days
after it came into force.73 They argued that the provision violated their right to
unreasonable search and seizure guaranteed by the Charter.74 In the alternative,
International Escort Services contended that the provision was ultra vires for going
beyond the authority to make bylaws granted by the Vancouver Charter.75 It was the
Court’s finding that while the impugned provision did not rise to the level of search and
seizure, the onerous record keeping requirements were beyond the scope of municipal
authority.76 The city argued that they were merely “regulating”, a power conferred by s.
271(1)(f), despite not being able to point to any specific bylaw or rule that would require
the information.77 The Court held that “inspection must be directed toward ensuring
compliance with some lawfully established requirement or standard”.78 As argued, the
City was asking for carte blanche to gather information from the businesses they
licensed, without being able to point to a specific purpose. Justice Lysyk could not accept
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that that “inspecting” should be construed so broadly and struck down the provision.79
Vancouver amended the licensing bylaw to reflect the judgment.80
The licensing fee for a social escort service in Vancouver is $1180 per year (in
addition to a $50.00 application fee which is applied to the cost of a license if the
applicant is successful).81 The licensing fee is considerable when compared to the cost of
licensing for other service providers. For example, a dating service can be licensed for
$159 per year, while a beauty salon license costs $240 per year.82

TORONTO’S BODY RUB PARLOURS
While Toronto does not require that escorts be licensed, a license is required for
owners and operators of body rub parlours. The Toronto Licensing bylaw defines a body
rub as including:
the kneading, manipulating, rubbing, massaging,
touching or stimulating, by any means, of a person’s
body or part thereof but does not include medical or
therapeutic treatment given by a person otherwise duly
qualified, licensed or registered to do so under the laws
of the Province of Ontario.83
Much like the social escort licensing in Vancouver, a license is required of both operators
and individual employees.84
The application process for an operator’s license is detailed and the requirements
vary according to the corporate structure of the proposed enterprise.85 Like other potential
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licensees, all the necessary forms, fees and photographs (one for the license, and one to
be kept on file with the city) must be filed in person.86 Body Rub licenses require prepayment. The payment is applied to the cost of a license for a successful applicant or
returned to an unsuccessful applicant.87 This provision applies solely to those seeking to
operate a body rub parlour.88 Those applying for a license are also expected to provide a
list of their anticipated employees.89 Operators and individuals also require medical
clearance to obtain a license or for a renewal.90 The medical form is provided by the city
and must be completed by a physician who certifies that the applicant is free from
communicable diseases and is “medically fit to perform or receive body-rubs”.91 License
applications are subject to review by both medical officials and the police, and other
government agencies.92 The bodies that review the application are given the opportunity
to include a report on the favourability or unfavourability of granting the license.93 In the
case of a negative report, the applicant has a right to a hearing before the city’s licensing
tribunal.94
The initial cost of a license to operate a body-rub parlour is $12,214.64.95 The
annual renewal fee is $11,802.76.96 Each attendant in a body rub parlour must also obtain
an initial license at a cost of $367.36, which is subject to an annual renewal cost of
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$258.70.97 Body Rub Parlours are also among the classes of businesses which require a
Preliminary Property Review.98 The review is completed by Toronto’s building division
and costs $215.17.99 This one time evaluation takes six to eight weeks to complete and
potential operators must provide 2 copies of a survey or site plan as well as a floor plan
(drawn to scale).100 The licensing of body rub parlours generates almost $1 million in
revenue for the city each year.101 For the sake of comparison, the cost of a license for a
business falling into the category of Personal Service Setting, which includes hair salons,
tattoo parlours, and aesthetic services, is $331.37 for the initial license and can be
renewed annually for $217.79.102
The Vancouver Social Escort licensing bylaw and the Toronto Body Rub
provisions are examples of the regimes that cities have put in place to regulate adultoriented businesses. Although conditions vary by city, these illustrations assist in
explaining why cities are the best source of regulation for decriminalized brothels.
Changes would be necessary to design a new licensing regime to address the specific
needs of sex workers. These licensing regimes represent a starting point, the details of
which will be critiqued in Chapter 3.103 These licensing regimes also provide insight into
how those involved in adult service businesses are affected and how changes to the
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licensing schemes that acknowledge that sex is for sale, could make their work safer and
more consistent with the occupational standards that apply to other professions.
Criminalization currently prevents that from occurring, leaving workers caught between
the federal and municipal regimes.

TURNING A BLIND EYE
The strongest argument for allowing municipalities to license sex work in brothels
is that they are already licensing sex work within other types of adult businesses. It is
well known that behind the closed doors of many adult service businesses, there is more
for sale than companionship.104 An escort interviewed for one study confirmed that cities
are turning a blind eye to the real nature of adult businesses: “[t]his is ridiculous. How
can anyone imagine that escort work is about anything but sex? How are we supposed to
work?”105 The same study also found that police too, were well aware of the realities:
“[e]scorting isn’t about prostitution…it is prostitution. But we can’t say that,” stated one
officer.106 Elizabeth, or Roxy, as her clients know her, is a sex worker who operates out
of a massage parlour in Edmonton. She described her appointments as beginning with a
massage, but leading “to sexual services that both she and the client agree to”.107 She
adds that, “[w]e offer anything from hand jobs, blow jobs to sex. Every girl offers
different stuff”.108 Refusing to acknowledge the true nature of adult businesses “allows
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municipalities to control and profit from sex industry businesses while simultaneously
maintaining the façade that they do not know what takes place inside them”.109
As cities “maintain a veneer of ignorance”,110 they have also made strategic
decisions to control sex work using bylaws, while the legitimacy of licensing remains
tempered by the need for workers to remain covert to avoid attracting the scrutiny of the
criminal law.111 For workers to truly be able to access the safety and security envisioned
in the Bedford decision, it is imperative that the criminal law governing adult sex work be
repealed to allow for municipal licensing that acknowledges sex is for sale. Given that
cities are already tasked with licensing a variety of businesses, adding decriminalized
brothels would be a natural extension of the licensing power they already have. This
would also allow sex workers greater “control over their working conditions and the
same rights and responsibilities as other political subjects and citizens”.112
Determining the best way to regulate the sex trade has been a struggle for
municipal governments, committees and advocacy organizations.113 When the Fraser
Committee released its final report in 1985, it recommended allowing sex work to occur
in private homes and in “small-scale, non-residential commercial prostitution
establishments”.114 Another bold recommendation of the committee was that:
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“prostitution establishments be permitted to be licensed and operated in accordance with
regulatory schemes established by a provincial or territorial legislature”.115 The
committee recommended liberalizing the laws around sex work as they presently
“operate in a way which victimizes and dehumanizes the prostitute”.116 While brothels
remained prohibited by the Criminal Code and therefore unable to be licensed by
municipalities, other adult businesses where sex is on offer covertly, are licensed. By
emphasizing the legal aspects of the adult services provided and downplaying the fact
that sex is for sale, some businesses are able to operate with the permission of cities.
The Federal Provincial Working Group on Prostitution, created in 1992 focused
largely on youth involved in sex work and street prostitution.117 They noted the
contradiction created by the municipal licensing provisions and suggested:
since many municipalities already regulate indirectly
what could be considered to be bawdy-houses, it would
be preferable to drop the fiction and simply allow bawdy
-houses to carry on business exempt from prosecution
under the Criminal Code, but subject to regulation by
the municipality. 118
The consultations and research conducted by the Working Group found that complaints
about massage parlours and escort agencies were infrequent and that “labour-intensive,
costly” investigations were not justified by the insignificant penalties.119 They reported:
“many feel that these non-enforcement practices ought to be formalized and that certain
prostitution activities should be allowed by establishing zones of tolerance or limited
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legitimate bawdy-house operations”.120 The main justification behind the now
unconstitutional bawdy-house provision was to “prevent community harms in the nature
of nuisance”.121 It is evident that not only are municipalities turning a blind eye and
licensing adult businesses where sex work is occurring, but that the concerns that bawdyhouses create nuisance in the community are often put forward to those with moral
objections to sex work.122
Beyond just turning a blind eye to sex being sold in massage parlours and escort
services, Dr. John Lowman’s analysis of municipally licensed adult businesses noted
specific provisions within the rules that show the sale of sex is already being
contemplated by municipal bylaws, even in the face of criminal prohibitions.123 His
examination of the Vancouver bylaws controlling adult businesses revealed that “the City
is attempting to limit prostitution to two venues: body-rub parlours and escort
services”.124 He cites the differences in conditions of licensing, advertising restrictions
and fees as proving that the city is both aware that sex is being sold and that the bylaws
were specifically crafted to restrict the sale of sex to these two venues.125 Regardless of
whether municipalities are turning a blind eye or explicitly confining paid sex to specific
places, it is evident that municipalities, or in the very least, Vancouver, is already
regulating brothels, just under a different name. It is also not limited to Vancouver:
Most Canadian cities currently license businesses that
are similar, if not identical to Vancouver’s escort
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agencies,
massage
parlour
services,
health
enhancement centres or steam baths and, in many
cases, but not all, these types of businesses offer sexual
services.126
The use of a social control model to regulate demonstrates that municipalities have turned
their minds to regulating sex work but in the most passive way possible: making the rules
onerous and expensive to discourage but profiting when a business is able to comply.
Lowman’s conclusion on Vancouver’s bylaws begins with the observation that
only the operators of body-rub parlours and escort agencies are compelled to provide the
names and addresses of their employees to the police.127 Toronto also requires all
applicants for body-rub licenses to undergo a police check and that their names be
submitted to the City (Municipal Licensing and Standards Division); however, the city
does not license escorting.128 Lowman argues that Vancouver has made deliberate
choices because the body-rub bylaw “does not expressly prohibit acts of prostitution”,
while the bylaw governing health enhancement centres explicitly states that no one on the
premises is permitted to “offer or engage in acts of prostitution”.129 For Lowman, the
silence in the body-rub provision indicates a more permissive stance since it was
obviously contemplated in the creation of the health enhancement provision.130
The licensing fees also indicate preferential treatment for some adult businesses
over others. Lowman asserts: “that if any doubt remains that the City Council overseeing
these by-laws knows that it is licensing prostitution, consider the fees the City charges for
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different categories of businesses”.131 The annual fee for a dating service in Vancouver is
$159 compared to an escort service that costs $1180.132 The cost for a license to operate a
body-rub parlour in Vancouver is $9987, and among the most expensive licenses the city
offers.133 The cost has risen significantly since Lowman’s submissions to the
subcommittee on Solicitation laws were written, when the cost of a license to operate a
body-rub parlour was $6527.134
While sex workers who operate from massage parlours or escort agencies have
always had to do so covertly, the new criminal provisions could have serious implications
for municipally licensed adult service providers. As mentioned in Chapter 1, working
within a “commercial enterprise” is now an aggravating factor that increases the penalty
for anyone providing services to a sex worker.135 Restrictions on advertising “sexual
services” in s. 286.4 could also impact municipally licensed adult service providers.136
Owners and operators of massage parlours and escort agencies will undoubtedly come
under increased scrutiny as new research shows that 25% of sex sellers are working in
these types of venues.137 The terms “commercial enterprise” and “sexual services” are not
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fully defined and the provisions have not yet been tested in court so the ramifications
remain unknown.138
The repeal of the criminal provisions would allow cities to provide better
information to workers who are granted licenses both to operate and to work in adult
service businesses. Instead of using the criminal law to condemn sex work, allowing
brothels to be licensed by municipalities provides an opportunity to furnish workers with
information that will enhance their health and safety, and let them know about support
and services that are available to them.
The full impact of the new criminal regime remains to be seen, but it has already
had a chilling effect. Toronto’s largest escort agency recently announced that escorts
would no longer be providing sexual services.139 Not wanting to be caught by the vague
‘commercial enterprise’ prohibitions, the agency’s owner has replaced the scantily
dressed escort photos with ones featuring escorts in cocktail dresses and employees have
signed contracts indicating they will not provide sexual services.140 While escort services
in Toronto are not subject to municipal licensing, Vancouver and other cities do require
licenses. The change in the criminal law could compound the difficulties of workers who
are trying to ascertain what is permitted and what is not under the new law.
While Cupid’s is just one agency, it could be a sign of what is to come. Cupid’s
owner has public stated she will no longer be providing condoms to her escorts. Even
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before the change in the criminal law, workers in adult service businesses were not
necessarily provided with safe sex supplies or information from their employers. Like
municipal staff, owners and managers of adult service businesses cannot openly
acknowledge that sex occurs. This hampers efforts to ensure safe sex supplies are used
and to connect workers with services that could provide free supplies.
The confusion over how cities could profit from licensing while the criminal
provision prohibiting living on the avails of prostitution was in effect has been settled as
that provision is no longer part of the Criminal Code. The new provision enacted in the
Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act will bring new confusion. Not
only could it be criminal for cities to profit from licensing fees but employees within
licensed adult service providers could also be at risk. The wording of the new provision
allows sex workers to pay for security, reception and other services but the service
providers must also furnish the same service to the public. This could mean that instead
of hiring drivers dedicated to chauffeuring workers to and from appointments, escort
agencies may be limited to using taxis and driver services that are also available to the
public. Instead of hiring or contracting security guards, agencies will have to ensure they
use security services with multiple clients. There are many potential problems with this
change in the law. A taxi driver would be unable to wait for an escort during her date, or
to provide security. The cost of hiring drivers could increase by paying multiple
individuals instead of salaried employees or contracted individuals. There is also the
potential that drivers (or security guards) who are not employees of the agency may not
exercise the same discretion to maintain the privacy of workers who do not wish their
occupation to become public. Until the courts test the new provisions, speculation looms.











The environment surrounding municipally licensed adult service businesses is

caught in a state of uncertainty. The prohibitions on purchasing sexual services have
already made it difficult for sex workers to confirm the identity of their clients, which has
been a longstanding method of screening.141 Valerie Scott, one of the litigants in Bedford,
stated the new law “isolates sex workers and makes them more vulnerable”.142 The
enhanced safety of working indoors is threatened by unclear criminal laws that could see
the closure of many adult service businesses – either because of being deemed
‘commercial enterprises’ under the material benefit clause, clients’ fears of being caught
in a sting or a raid, or because attracting business is too difficult because of the new
advertising prohibitions. With so many questions about the new law left unanswered, it
will be for the courts to determine how to interpret the provisions. This thesis seeks to
illuminate some of the hardships that workers endure by being governed by regimes that
are permissive on one hand and prohibitive on the other. Although this discussion is
largely based on the experiences of sex workers under the former laws, it appears that the
new ones will create equal, if not more difficulties for workers. 

LICENSED BUT STILL ILLEGAL – THE PRECARIOUS SITUATION FOR ADULT
SERVICE PROVIDERS

Having established that municipalities are already, knowingly, licensing sex work,
it is important to appreciate how that affects those who work in licensed massage
parlours, body-rub parlours and escort services. While they have paid the fees to the
municipality to obtain a license, the services they provide remain prohibited by the
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criminal law. The juxtaposition of these two regimes creates confusion and jeopardizes
the health and safety of sex workers.143
Adult service providers, licensed by cities, describe the conflict with the criminal
law as a lack of information about the law; an inability to benefit from health and safety
measures; confusion over the proceeds of licensing; and fragile relationships with those
tasked with bylaw enforcement.144
In many cases, the removal of the federal criminal provisions could help improve
working conditions for municipally licensed workers by allowing municipalities to
provide information without condoning sex work, to make health and safety a priority
and to foster better relationships with enforcement officers simply by acknowledging that
sex work is occurring.

NEED FOR INFORMATION

For municipally licensed adult workers, clear and accurate information on the law
can be difficult to obtain. As one worker stated: “[t]he City knows what escorting is but
they just brush it under the carpet, so they don’t have to give us any protection or
information”.145 It appears that because of the federal prohibitions and municipal
restrictions of certain actions, neither level of government is willing to clearly detail how
to work and remain compliant with the laws. Lewis and Maticka-Tyndale found:
“[i]nterviewees complained that when the license was purchased they were not offered
any information about what is legal and what was not under the terms and conditions of
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their license by the police or bylaw authorities”.146 While most applicants appreciate the
nature of the work in massage parlours, rarely is it expressed in explicit terms.147 If it
were, it would be clear that cities are already licensing sex work.
Owners and workers in licensed adult industries are responsible for knowing what
laws apply to their business and how to conduct themselves within the law.148 Being
governed by both federal and municipal law complicates their ability to find the answers
they need. Lewis and Maticka-Tyndale interviewed one municipal employee who
indicated that the criminal law hindered the city’s ability to provide information or
services and suggested: “the assumption is that the provision of services and information
encourages individuals to participate in the exchange of sex for money.”149 This means
that instead of municipalities providing literature, or even offering to facilitate
information sessions (which for the privacy of workers, could also be internet-based),
owners and workers need to source the information on their own because cities fear that
providing guidance could be mistaken for condoning sex work.150
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A MATTER OF HEALTH AND SAFETY
Not being permitted to acknowledge that sex is for sale in municipally licensed
adult businesses means that information on safe sex education programs for workers and
the rights of employees in these businesses (for example, the right to refuse a client), are
also not being addressed. Workers who sell sex must not only do so covertly, but also
accept the responsibility for obtaining their own safe sex supplies, as their employer
cannot be expected to provide it or advocate for its use. This applies equally to employees
and clients, as neither can benefit from safe sex education. The problem created by the
two sets of laws means that promoting safe sex within the industry cannot be done
openly. This was affirmed by a study which found:“[b]ylaws restrict labour-management
practices, including safety measures and provision of occupational safety and safety
information and supplies since owner operators have to pretend there is no sex work
involved.”151 Without the criminal provisions, municipalities could mandate that safe sex
supplies be available. The current challenge is that while municipalities know that sex is
for sale, the federal law prohibits them from taking action to encourage safe sex.

PROFITING FROM THE AVAILS
The Bedford case was successful in having s. 212 (1)(j) of the Criminal Code,
which prohibited receiving a financial benefit from the prostitution of others, overturned.
However, the new criminal provisions have to a large degree reinstated it and explicitly
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criminalized receiving a “material benefit” through a “commercial enterprise”.152 While
cities turn a blind eye to how profits are made, licensees pointed to the obvious
contradiction:
Owners were confused about how they could be
charged with “living off the avails”, but the city, which
makes money through licensing the agencies and
workers, and Revenue Canada, which makes money
through taxing the industry, could not be similarly
charged.153
Confusion over what is caught by the criminal provision of living on the avails,
led to changes in how Calgary licenses escorts. In 2006, a city firefighter was convicted
of keeping a common bawdy-house, two counts of living on the avails of prostitution, and
use of a cell phone while prohibited, all in relation to an escort service he was
managing.154 He was successful in having the convictions for living on the avails stayed
by arguing “officially induced error”.155 The trial judge found that his belief that: “the
license to escort superseded any Criminal Code provisions around prostitution, and that
the women providing sexual services were therefore working legally” was reasonable.156
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In December 2006, Calgary enacted a new Dating and Escort Service Bylaw with
reduced fees for licensing.157 The cost of obtaining a license to operate an escort agency
or to work as an escort within an agency is $170 for the initial application and $130 to
renew a license.158 This brought the licensing fees for escorts in line with the fees for
other businesses or service providers so that if the city was indeed profiting from licensed
sex work, it was doing so at a rate that was identical to every other licensed business.159
Chapters three and four demonstrate why setting fees akin to other businesses is
desirable.

ENFORCEMENT
The other major conflict between municipally licensed adult businesses and the
federal law is the enforcement of bylaws. Having already established that workers are
unsure of their rights, bylaw enforcement, either by city officials or police, creates
additional tension. Both police and city officials have acknowledged their awareness that
sex is for sale and this creates tenuous relationships between licensees (owners and
workers alike) and those tasked with inspections.
Workers found: “[i]nspections and enforcement related to sex work are conducted
disproportionately to other forms of licensed work.”160 As mentioned, inspections and
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investigations are typically driven by complaints so it is natural that an escort agency or
massage parlour may be the target of more frequent inspections than a hair salon, which
does not face the same stigma as an adult services business. The nature of adult work also
puts these businesses at an increased risk of being part of a sting operation when police
attempt to ascertain if any of the Criminal Code provisions on sex work are being broken.
Visits from bylaw enforcement officers can be stressful as “[t]he limited knowledge sex
workers have of bylaws and penalties for bylaw infractions make it difficult for them to
defend or affirm their rights”.161 This has an effect on relationships between businesses
and enforcement. As Laing noted: “relationships with officers were fragile and dependent
on the wider political climate of the municipality”.162 The power imbalance between
enforcement and licensed workers only adds to the tension of the relationship.
Being forced to pretend sex is not for sale creates significant hardships for
workers. Workers turn over their personal information to be licensed but in return receive
little information on how to work legally, enhance their safety or assert their rights. They
are also left wondering why it is permissible for cities to profit from licensing fees, all the
while knowing that sex work is occurring. Instead of making adult service providers feel
confident about working in a licensed industry, enforcement is seen as intimidating. The
imposition of both the federal and municipal laws needlessly add frustration, health risks
and stress to an already demanding occupation.
Bylaw enforcement is a significant stressor for municipally licensed adult
workers. While they have the relative safety of an indoor location, by selling sex, they
remain at risk of being caught and losing their license. The vicious circle that is created
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means that losing a license, or being charged with prostitution offences under the
Criminal Code can mean turning to other forms of sex work where there is less security,
for example street based work.163 Without the federal prohibitions, the relationship
between enforcement officers and workers could facilitate better working conditions, and
better rules for health and safety, and help to establish relationships of trust so that
exploitation can be exposed. As it stands, workers are unsure of their rights and
suspicious of the motives of enforcement officers.

CONCLUSION
The courts have gradually allowed for more purposive interpretation of municipal
enactments, as municipal lawmakers are democratically elected and responsible to the
communities that they serve. Municipalities must only legislate within the realm of the
authority delegated to them by the provinces, or risk having their bylaws struck down.
This also means that encroaching on powers assigned to the Federal Government is
forbidden. While the courts have designated moral issues as the domain of the Federal
Government, within the confines of a licensing regime, provisions that might otherwise
be deemed issues of morality have been accepted as permissible so long as they were
enacted for the purpose of regulating business.
The licensing bylaws for Vancouver’s social escorts and Toronto’s body rub
practitioners provide examples of how adult service providers are licensed in two of
Canada’s largest cities. The conditions are strict and the licensing fees are high, which is
indicative of the cities’ desire to control the industries, while collecting the profits. As
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between cities there is no uniformity between what is licensed and how; bylaws are
localized responses. In one city a license may be required for escorting, while in another
a license may not be necessary as no regulation exists. The same could be said for body
rub parlours, massage parlours, health enhancement centres and other businesses that
offer adult services. Each city must address adult services in a manner that is both within
their authority and reflects local needs. While the repeal of the criminal law will not quell
the desire of cities to profit from licensing, it would facilitate a means for the
acknowledgement that sexual services are in fact being licensed and allow for open
conversations with workers to develop more appropriate licensing regimes.
Although it is common knowledge that sex is for sale in municipally licensed
adult businesses, the federal law forces cities to turn a blind eye. Cities have limited
means of raising revenue but licensing fees are allowable.164 In the case of adult service
providers, those fees are high. The implications of the new criminal regime on
municipally licensed adult service providers are still unknown but early analysis indicates
that it could have serious repercussions.165 Municipalities may be forced to reconsider
licensing bylaws, which could drastically alter the ability of these businesses to
operate.166
Adult service providers are caught between municipal licensing regimes that seek
to make their work lawful and the federal criminal law that seeks to condemn them.
While licensing adds “legitimacy”, it also “appears to increase police presence” and
“disempower escorts and their employers from taking action to enhance their own health
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and safety”.167 City officials accept payments and hand over licenses but are reluctant to
provide information that would help workers understand the legal parameters of their
work. Workers are responsible for discerning how to work legally, or how to work within
a licensed environment and avoid raising the suspicions of enforcement officials.
The imposition of the two regimes also has repercussions for health and safety.
Operators of adult services cannot promote safe sex – to employees or clients – because
they must not acknowledge that sex is occurring. While Federal prohibitions remain in
place, municipal licensing cannot be used as effectively as a tool to address health and
safety concerns. Allowing municipalities to license brothels outright would not only
allow for the creation of better, more tailored licensing regimes, but it would provide
added protection for workers.
Allowing municipalities to use their business licensing authority to regulate
brothels is far more preferable to additional criminal prohibitions that leave workers
caught in limbo between licensed adult services and the criminal law. The confusion
created comes at the expense of the health, safety and security of workers. Bedford
resolved any mystery that remained about how to sell sex in a safer manner. Allowing
workers more control over their businesses, by acknowledging that sex is being
exchanged for money, also can aid municipalities in developing better licensing regimes.
The new criminal provisions will only ensure that confusion over what is legal and what
is not persists.
While licensing has been presented as a better alternative to the criminal law, in
the case of regulating sex work, it is by no means beyond critique. In addition to the
complications for workers addressed in this chapter, there are provisions within the
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licensing bylaws that raise concerns for workers. There are also many positive aspects of
licensing. Having presented representative provisions from Vancouver and Toronto, and
explored the difficulties of complying with both municipal and Federal law, chapter three
will expand on the licensing regimes and analyze the benefits and drawbacks of the
systems that are in place.










CHAPTER 3 - BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF LICENSING

INTRODUCTION

While cities license massage parlours and escort services, it should not be
assumed that this permission equates with approval. The previous chapter established that
municipalities are the proper authority for business licensing, which has enabled them to
create licensing regimes for adult service providers. The Federal criminal law control of
prostitution requires cities to tread carefully to avoid having their bylaws struck down as
ultra vires.1 While the federal and municipal regimes attempt to co-exist, sex workers are
left in a precarious position: they are required to obtain a license to work legally but their
actual work leaves them vulnerable to criminal charges. For these workers, the high fees
paid for a license still preclude them from many of the health and safety benefits that a
licensing regime can enhance and relationships with police and other enforcement
officials remain strained. This chapter highlights the experiences of workers within these
license regimes and how they are impacted, for better or for worse.
While street-based sex work is often the focus of media reports, the majority of
commercial sex transactions take place in other venues.2 Massage parlours and escort
services are among the top choices of those who purchase sexual services.3 With sex
work already occurring in municipally licensed adult businesses, workers are already in a
position to speak to the benefits and drawbacks of licensing regimes, even if the
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effectiveness of the regimes are currently hampered by criminalization. The views of sex
workers offer insight into what aspects of licensing regimes are good for them as
workers, and what hardships are caused for workers beyond the imposition of the
criminal law.
The type of licensing regime a city enacts also influences the benefits and
drawbacks to licensing. Crofts and Summerfield argue that the effectiveness of licensing
regimes depends on “the underlying principles and processes”, and the extent to which
sex work remains criminalized.4 The underlying goals of a licensing regime can enhance
or undermine the efficacy of licensing.5 When considered as a continuum, a licensing
regime that proscribes different conditions on sex industry businesses and takes a
“negative moral stance to sex work” is deemed one of “social control”.6 This echoes the
assertion of Dr. John Lowman, noted in the previous chapter, that cities are trying to
control where sex is sold by imposing different conditions on different venues.7

At the

opposite end of the spectrum is a neutral licensing regime that “licenses the sex industry
in a similar way to other areas of business”.8 New Zealand is representative of the
neutral-model and will be compared in the following chapter. The underlying goal of a
licensing regime has a significant impact on how workers feel about licensing, working
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conditions and the participation in the regime.9 The contrast between the social control
model and the neutral model makes it evident that the policy influencing the bylaws can
be as impactful as the words that are used.
Any regulatory scheme, regardless of intent, has benefits and drawbacks. Sex
workers operating out of massage parlours and escort services are simultaneously
criminalized and controlled by licensing regimes. Despite those burdens, municipal
licensing has brought a measure of legitimacy to the adult services industry and has also
allowed for better risk management practices for workers. The improvements, although
tempered by efforts to discourage and control the industry, show ways in which licensing
has great potential to benefit workers.
Current licensing regimes, beyond the hardships imposed by criminal law, also
raise significant concerns for workers. Adult service providers cite a lack of privacy and
cost as the biggest drawbacks to licensing regimes controlling massage parlours and
escort services. These factors are the result of a social control licensing regime. This
illuminates the need for a change in the policy behind licensing, in addition to changes to
the criminal law, if licensing regimes are to benefit workers and encourage their
participation in the regime.
The conversation about decriminalized brothels began with Bedford but it does
not end there. The Supreme Court was clear that the law should not exacerbate the
vulnerabilities of sex workers.10 In response, the Federal government drafted Bill C-36
which aims to:
reduce the demand for prostitution by targeting the
consumer, the pimps and the johns who are the
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enablers; making prostitution itself illegal, which is a
move away from simply criminalizing certain aspects
or parts of the practice; and discouraging entry into
prostitution itself.11
Opponents of the bill have been clear that bolstering the Criminal Code with new
provisions does not enhance the safety of sex workers. Speaking before the House of
Commons Justice Committee, Jean McDonald, Executive Director of Maggie’s in
Toronto explained: “[c]riminalization breeds isolation and isolation, in turn, breeds
vulnerability to violence, exploitation and abuse”12 These are the very things the Bedford
Court held were an affront to the guarantee of security of the person under s. 7 of the
Charter.13 The provisions in Bill C-36 became law on December 6, 2014. While they
may be law, they may not withstand constitutional scrutiny by the Courts.14 This suggests
that the conversation about how to regulate sex work in Canada is still a long way from
concluding.
This chapter builds on the understanding of Canadian municipal licensing regimes
established in Chapter 2 by highlighting the perspective of the workers. It demonstrates
that the benefits of licensing are closely tied to the intent of the licensing regime and
how, particularly with continued criminalization, the benefits will be virtually cancelled
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by the drawbacks of participating in the licensing regime. The views of workers are
instructive for drafting licensing bylaws for decriminalized brothels. In expressing both
the benefits and the drawbacks of licensing, sex workers emphasize fairness and the need
for a policy shift in the goals of licensing.
In this chapter the opinions of workers on licensing show what aspects of
licensing are beneficial and what aspects should be reconsidered when designing
regulations tailored to brothels. It will also underscore how policies of social control
hinder the advantages that licensing can foster. For the sake of simplicity, the two
systems will be examined side by side instead of co-mingling the provisions and their
effects. This chapter will focus on Canadian sex workers who currently operate in a
system that is reminiscent to that of New Zealand prior to decriminalization.15 This
discussion of the pros and cons of municipal licensing as practiced in Canada under a
criminalized regime will be juxtaposed, in the following chapter, with an exploration of
licensing in New Zealand - a jurisdiction where, as mentioned previously, the sex trade
was decriminalized in 2003.16

BENEFITS
Current municipal licensing schemes were not explicitly designed to regulate the
selling of sex because that would be an intrusion into the Federal criminal law powers.
Despite that, massage parlours and escort services are among the top choices for those
seeking out sexual services. Even in the face of the onerous conditions described in the
previous chapter, workers in municipally licensed adult service businesses have
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expressed some positive aspects of licensing, even while it was not designed to meet their
needs. Although these benefits could be more fully harnessed without the imposition of
the criminal law, they indicate where licensing can potentially improve working
conditions for sex workers. The main benefits that sex workers operating within the
municipally licensed regime express are: improved legitimacy and a better capability to
manage the risks of the profession.17 It would be wholly unfair to suggest that there is
nothing beneficial about licensing and then to assert that cities should issue licenses for
brothels. Bedford co-applicant, Valerie Scott, had hoped the case would pave the way for
“fair business regulations” and as Mariana Valverde points out, “Canadian cities are not
starting from zero”.18 Part of determining the best practices for licensing brothels is to
examine what works and what does not work about the system that is already in place for
other adult businesses. The first step should not be to try and reinvent the wheel.

LICENSED LEGITIMACY
There is a well-entrenched stigma attached to working in the sex trade.19 In fact,
the stigmatization from being a sex worker “is one of the strongest societal stigmas an
individual may ever face”.20 Even though sex workers earn a living, “social discredit”
means they are often precluded from many of the benefits that those working in straight
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jobs take for granted.21 While stigma has many sources, criminal laws that govern sex
work rooted in notions of “nuisance”, “neighbourhood disruption” and “protection”22
make it difficult for sex work to be viewed as a rightful profession. While the
decriminalization of sex work has shown promise in reducing stigma23, having municipal
regulations that license adult service providers is also a step towards combatting the
negative stigma faced by sex workers. Even while the criminal law prohibits adult
businesses from acknowledging that sexual services may be offered behind closed doors,
requiring such businesses to be licensed allows the workers the benefit of recognized
work.
For some workers, holding a municipal license offers a sense of legitimacy that
counters some of the negative effects of stigmatization.24 Workers are more self-assured
because the license represents “the privilege to operate a sex business”.25 Although far
from perfect, it is a step in the right direction for changing attitudes towards sex
businesses:“[m]unicipal licensing provides a semblance of legitimacy for the occupation,
potentially combatting the negative emotional and social effects of stigmatization”.26
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The work position, as detailed in Chapter 1, demands that sex work be treated as a
profession. Corriveau hypothesizes that the key to improving the lives of sex workers is
the legitimization of the industry. She states: “[p]rohibiting the professionalization of sex
work will not make it possible to control abusers and swindlers and to improve female
sex workers’ working conditions, living conditions and safety”.27 A license to operate or
work in the adult services industry serves as a recognition of labour. It offers the
opportunity to capitalize on the benefits that come with being a worker, including the
ability to contribute to programs provided through taxation, access credit and other
banking services, and to rent accommodations.28
Some licensed workers found a sense of confidence by having their work
recognized as permissible employment. One worker expressed her views on licensing by
highlighting the independence it provided her:
A lot of people are still going to be prejudiced against
us, but now that we have our license, we’re selfemployed. It shows we are legally working …So, if I
want to lease a car, I can say, I’m an escort, here’s my
license. It’s easier that way because before…there was
no proof that you were doing it”.29
The benefit for this worker was both in her confidence and her ability to provide for
herself. Another worker found that licensing was a benefit for clients. While their own
legitimacy was increased, the license also put their clients more at ease. One worker
described it as follows: “ [A] lot of guys like the license because well they know I’m
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legal and don’t have a criminal record”.30 The legitimacy that workers feel also helps
shift the power to them. Adult service providers expressed more confidence because the
work they do is recognized and allows them more control over their environment:
The bottom line is, it’s licensed, it’s legal, it’s a
business that people have to treat as such. So, before
we were licensed anybody that was working got ripped
off all the time – customers stole everything, customers
got ripped off, the girls got beat up, there was nothing
you could do about it”.31
This escort’s description shows how the balance of power has shifted in favour of the
workers because they are not just providing adult services; they are licensed and running
a business where it becomes easier to demand payment for services, enforce rules and
assert control over services and clients. While there will always be customers who
attempt to garner more services or who request discounts, municipally licensed facilities
are in a better position to refuse to provide services.32 Sex workers are frequently cast as
victims, but when asked whether the seller or the buyer is ultimately in control of the
transaction, a strong majority of sex workers responded that it is the seller who is in
control; the clients echoed that finding.33
Licensing allows qualified persons in, but also keeps unlicensed workers out of
the market.34 This is both a benefit and a drawback. A hierarchy is created in the market
place because some workers are ineligible for a license, often because of a criminal
record involving past charges for prostitution or because of their residency status.
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Workers in licensed adult businesses may have more power to control the transactions
that they enter into, whereas a worker who is unable to obtain a license may be forced to
accept whatever business they can attract.35 The disparity between licensed and
unlicensed workers can result in unsafe conditions for unlicensed workers. This needs to
be taken into consideration when creating licensing regimes for decriminalized sex work
so that the bylaws do not needlessly exacerbate this situation. How to precisely do this
will be examined further in chapter five. However, the need for a better understanding of
how the sex trade operates is necessary to ensure that bylaws do not create more harm
than good.
While even decriminalization cannot instantly erase the long-held stigma attached
to the sex trade, perhaps time and the legitimizing of sex professions can.36 Allowing sex
workers to operate under municipally licensed regimes provides them with the benefit of
work, and also the ability to participate in other facets of society that those in straight
professions take for granted. Being able to obtain a mortgage, lease a vehicle, or know
that savings can be accrued in bank accounts without the fear they will be confiscated as
the proceeds of crime, all contribute to the financial freedom that sex workers are seeking
to attain.37 While people enter the sex trade for a variety of reasons, the bottom line for
most is: “it’s the money, honey”.38 This is also supported by new research that found
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“potential income and the freedom to be independent” were key factors in one’s decision
to sell sex.39

RISK MANAGEMENT

Workers in municipally licensed adult businesses have not only the benefit of
increased legitimacy, but also an increased ability to practice risk management strategies.
Municipalities use licensing as a means to control adult service businesses by limiting
their locations, hours and making licenses expensive. However, indoor venues still
provide safer workplaces for those who provide sexual services, when compared to other
places sex workers operate.40 Working from a fixed location also enhances the safety of
adult service providers because it “shifts the power” to the worker.41
There is wisdom in the phrase safety in numbers. It holds especially true for sex
workers. While criminal provisions largely prevent street-based workers from working
together, working in a municipally licensed adult service business allows, and in some
cases requires, working with others.42 Many cities have developed licensing regimes that
make it difficult, or impossible to work as an independent.43 For example, in Vancouver,
the licensing requirements for escorts dictate that an employee must be present during
business hours.44 This means that someone is present at the agency while the escorts are
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working, and aware of which escorts are out on dates and with whom. Managers of sex
businesses reported that in 90% of transactions, there is either someone nearby as a safety
mechanism or a call is placed to “check-in” with a worker who is on an out-call.45
The Bedford case repeatedly cited the importance of screening clients for a
propensity of violence as being paramount to the safety of workers.46 Not only are
transactions occurring within municipally licensed businesses likely to be less rushed, the
ability to mitigate risk is much greater. The latest Canadian research indicates that for sex
workers and managers of sex businesses, access to phones, screening, obtaining payment
prior to services and remaining sober while working, remain their key safety strategies.47
Managers reported using these tools with virtually every transaction.48 Sex workers
working for third parties were also more likely to employ the services of a driver, as
opposed to those who worked independently.49 These safety measures are vital for the
health and safety of sex workers. Within the more structured setting of a massage parlour
or escort service, these risk management strategies have a greater chance of becoming
part of the normal operating procedures.
Licensing allows for minimum standards of light, cleanliness and facilities.50 For
sex workers operating from municipally licensed businesses, having regulations that
dictate what constitutes an acceptable working environment means better conditions in
which to work. While selling sex remains covert, the environment in which they operate
is significantly improved. For example, Toronto’s licensing for body rub parlours
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prohibits facilities from having locking doors in rooms where body rubs are provided51,
thus allowing immediate access if a worker is faced with a violent or uncontrollable
client. While violent clients are not the norm, conflict can arise in a situation where one
person in the transaction does not have the ability to seek recourse and is not limited to
sex work.52
Not every workplace is equal and the risk management strategies of some may be
better than others. Sex workers are also not a homogenous group and individual opinions
can vary. The rules that are put in place by licensing regimes are unlikely to ever win
unanimous support but they show considerable promise in enhancing the safety of sex
workers.
That sex workers benefit from greater legitimacy and better risk management
practices should also not come as a surprise. These are also factors that were advanced by
the Canadian Organization for the Rights of Prostitutes (CORP, the precursor
organization to Sex Professionals of Canada) during the Fraser committee hearings.53
CORP advocated for decriminalization stating that the ability to work indoors would
offer women “increased security for the prostitutes by reducing the potential for
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exploitation by customer, police and pimp” and “a sense of dignity and self worth”.54
Even with imperfect licensing regimes, these are the benefits that sex workers articulated.

DRAWBACKS
The current situation of Canadian sex workers plying their trade in licensed adult
businesses is not unlike the situation that sex workers in New Zealand were in prior to
decriminalization of the sex trade in that country. New Zealand’s Massage Parlours Act
1978 allowed for the licensing of massage parlours, but frequent police inspections and
record keeping made the situation tenuous for sex workers.55 The criminal laws
prohibited prostitution, so those who worked covertly behind the doors of massage
parlours were under the control of massage parlour owners.56 Just as in Canada, the
juxtaposition of the criminal and municipal law prevented sex workers from exercising
their agency and being in control of their own labour.
Criminalization and a regulatory framework that discourages the adult services
industry from flourishing diminish the benefits of licensing. Even repealing the criminal
laws surrounding sex work does not mean that the current bylaws that regulate adult
service businesses could be re-issued and applied to decriminalized brothels because
these regimes are still based on the social control model. Crofts and Summerfield state
that “complex, intrusive and administratively opaque licensing systems” may cause
harms to sex workers that are akin to criminalization.57
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This section will highlight two of the major drawbacks to municipal licensing that
sex workers have expressed: privacy and the cost of licensing.58 Municipally licensed sex
industry businesses are treated differently than other businesses as a means of controlling
them. Two conclusions can be drawn from the discussion of privacy and cost: current
licensing bylaws for massage parlour and escort agencies are inadequate for regulating
brothels if sex work is decriminalized and “cumbersome” regulation only frustrates
compliance.59

PRIVACY

Privacy for sex workers is multi-faceted. Some do not disclose their work to
family or friends.60 Others worry that their work in the sex trade will become a bar to
future opportunity.61 Personal privacy and the ability to separate work and home lives is
also crucial to sex workers.62 These are all valid reasons, given that the stigma attached
to sex work is so pervasive.63 A licensing regime should take these factors into
consideration and be designed to respect the privacy concerns of sex workers.
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The current Canadian licensing regimes require individual workers to be licensed.
While sex workers could agree to the licensing of businesses under certain conditions,
they do not agree with licenses for individual escorts because they find that it would be
“impractical and would reduce the autonomy of independent workers”.64 Licensing
creates a paper trail that workers fear will have future consequences.65 Given the
transitory nature of sex work, adult service providers often use the work as a means of
financing education or as a temporary means of earning an income.66 For workers, once
licensed, the lingering evidence of having worked for a massage parlour or escort agency
means that the stigma could have consequences if they are subjected to background
checks.67 Many workers maintain strict boundaries between their job and their home life
that licensing could compromise.68 As one worker stated: “I don’t want my name
associated with this”.69 Not all adult service providers are able to be open about their
profession because of the stigma, which makes the current municipal provisions
problematic. Requiring each individual worker to have a license means that even if they
work in the industry temporarily, doing so legally means a record has been created.
From providing for families to financing education, there are a plethora of reasons
why people work in the adult service industry. Municipal licensing raises privacy
concerns for workers because government departments could access the paper trail of
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their employment.70 For example, in Vancouver, the bylaw still requires social escorts to
provide the names of employees and customers to police on demand.71
While this is less of a concern for those who are diligent about reporting their
income for tax purposes, the records “may be subpoenaed in legal proceedings, such as
child custody and criminal cases”.72 Workers fear that working as an adult service
provider will taint their reputations and put them at risk of charges or losing custody or
access to their children. While these represent potentially the most serious consequences,
there is also the possibility that they will be denied other employment or opportunities.
Workers are usually uncertain of when their former employment will show up in
background checks:
So whenever an employer says they are going to do a
background check, now I always ask them what kind,
and it’s a little frustrating because you don’t know what
they are looking for, and you don’t know where it’s
posted.73
This fear could lead some workers to resist working in licensed businesses or prevent
them from leaving licensed work.
Many street-based workers acknowledge that they would rather work from an
indoor location because massage parlours and escort services provide an indoor
environment that is not only safer but also keeps them out of public view.74 Licensing
means that adult service providers have a slightly different privacy concern. Instead of
being worried about being spotted by someone who could out him or her, they fear that
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their employment history could be used against them.75 These privacy concerns are very
real and workers have advised that: “regardless of any social or legal reforms, there will
always be a street-level industry because of the anonymity and convenience for some
workers”.76 The fact that workers would choose to remain street-based instead of
applying for a municipal license represents not only a drawback to the current licensing
regimes, but also highlights an issue that must be addressed in licensing regimes designed
for decriminalized brothels.
Even with legal reform that makes sex work permissible, the stigma does not
disappear with the criminal provisions. Privacy will remain a concern for sex workers.77
It has been demonstrated that stigma is the reason many adult service providers and sex
workers guard the nature of their professions with vigilant secrecy. Crofts and
Summerfield, while not directly addressing privacy, do note that “the right to privacy is
severely jeopardised by the power of some bodies to require any information they see
fit”.78 To accommodate licensing for decriminalized brothels,
municipalities will need to find a way to address these privacy concerns.

COST

Licensing schemes can be effective and beneficial to both workers and
municipalities, but only if workers can afford the cost of a license. John Lowman’s
critique of the cost structure for licensing in Vancouver, detailed in Chapter 2, highlights
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the price differential between the various businesses that are licensed.79 A license for a
body rub parlour is the third most expensive license offered by the city. Lowman also
contends that the difference between the cost of operating a dating service and an escort
service “is to clarify which business is involved in commercial sex”.80 The inflated prices
for licensing can only be explained as an instrument of control. The requirement for each
worker to obtain a license is not only an invasion of privacy but it compounds the amount
of money that a city can make through licensing.
Workers express concerns over the cost of licensing in three main ways: the cost
is higher in comparison to other licenses;81 the cost is prohibitive to the point of being
exclusionary;82 the cost restricts their mobility83. Workers are willing to participate in
licensing schemes but the current costs for licensing adult service providers can increase
the vulnerability of sex workers. Under a criminalized regime, adult service providers
who are required to be licensed will continue to be excluded from most of the benefits
licensing could provide, while being forced to pay licensing fees that amount to little
more than a sin tax.84 The Supreme Court was clear in Bedford that laws are arbitrary
when there is no link between the object of the law and its effect.85 Bylaws which purport
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to license while increasing the vulnerabilities of sex workers may not only be at risk of
being challenged but should not be replicated to license decriminalized brothels.

HIGHER COST COMPARED TO OTHER LICENSES
Some adult service providers do not dispute paying for licenses so much as they
find it unfair that licenses to work as adult service providers are disproportionately higher
than the costs for licensing in other industries.86 The disproportionately high fees have
been the subject of court challenges but none have been successful in having the license
fees quashed or re-evaluated.87
In Re Try-San International Ltd.88 fees, among other provisions, were challenged
as being prohibitive, discriminatory, and ultra vires of council’s authority in its attempt to
legislate morality.89 The appellants were unsuccessful in their bid to have the bylaw
struck down as the court deemed the bylaw to be regulatory.90 Taggart JA did not close
the door to future challenges. Instead, he clarified what evidence that may assist the court
in reaching a determination that a bylaw is overreaching and should be struck down. He
stated that more evidence pertaining to the “economic effects” of the bylaw on body rub
parlours generally would be necessary to advance the argument that the fees are
prohibitory.91
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PROHIBITIVE COSTS
The cost of licensing for adult service providers also keeps many from seeking a
license in the first place. The cost of licensing has become a barrier for many who would
move off the street to the relative safety of indoor work.92 As one worker stated: “what
would compel a person to go indoors at those prices?”93 For those who use sex work as a
means of survival, to top up social assistance earnings, or who work in the trade from
time to time, licensing not only creates a record of their employment in adult services but
the cost can prevent them from opting for the safety of indoor locations.94 Many find the
cost of licensing puts them between a rock and a hard place:
The escort license is prohibitive…$1500 for an
independent escort license…which is really out of
reach for a lot of girls out there, a lot of them are single
parents and we are doing this part time. So I mean it’s
either get a license or they are back out on the street.95
There are many reasons workers choose sex work over traditional jobs and the need for
better pay, flexible hours and not wanting to resort to social assistance are unchanged,
regardless of how onerous it is to obtain a license.96 If a person chooses to enter into sex
work and prefers working for a third-party over independent work and the responsibility
of finding their own clients, that choice should not be negated by the high cost of
licensing. Ideally, all sex workers who want to move into safer work environments
should not be hindered by criminal law or cost.
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The high costs of licensing do not only affect the cost of doing business for sex
workers, it also affects their mobility. Many escorts travel to different cities to meet
clients because it allows for increased anonymity. Working outside of the city where they
reside is not uncommon: “42% of sex workers said that more than 20% of their past-year
sexual transactions took place in an area outside of their current municipality”.97 While
the new advertising prohibitions threaten to have a chilling effect that will have the
greatest impact on those who travel for work98, the cost of obtaining a license to remain
compliant with municipal bylaws is also prohibitive.
This business model becomes especially expensive when a license is required for each
location, even though an escort’s presence in that location is temporary.99 “If a female
escort wanted to tour five Canadian cities, crossing municipal boundaries, and at all times
be operating ‘legally’ under a license, the fees could top $10,000”.100 Imposing fees in
each city where an escort works makes the work more onerous because of the continuous
need to maintain licenses, which may be denied because the escort is not a resident, or
because she works independently. This denial of mobility means that a worker who
travels for work may remain outside of the licensing regime.
Thus the cost remains one of the main drawbacks to licensing. This issue could be
solved if the fees for adult service providers were comparable to that of other businesses
and the requirement for individual workers to hold licenses was re-evaluated. Sex
workers take the position that: “the number and type of restrictions, and the licensing fees
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for sex industry businesses should be equivalent to those for other businesses”.101
Licensing fees for escorts in Calgary were lowered in 2006, proving that it is feasible for
cities to license adult services at rates comparable to other businesses.102 One of the
features of a social control licensing regime is that “many workers will not be able or
willing to participate in the framework” making licensing less effective.103

CONCLUSION

By all indications, the adult services industry is one that municipalities love to
hate. Through licensing cities can control these types of businesses while maintaining the
position that they are unsavory. The businesses are left to pay high fees in hopes that
maintaining a valid license convinces enforcement officials to look the other way. Any
benefits that sex workers garner from working in a municipally licensed sex business are
subsequently quashed by the drawbacks of obtaining a license. The use of the social
control model is evident in Canadian licensing regimes. In combination with continued
criminalization, the situation is unlikely to improve. With the passing of Bill C-36, the
situation of sex workers working within municipally licensed businesses could become
much worse as police begin targeting their clients.
Sex workers have been clear in their desire to be treated like any other business
owner or service provider. They are not asking for an absence of rules, but instead they
want a set of rules that is both fair and addresses their concerns over cost and privacy,
which are often interconnected. “[T]hose sex workers who felt that such businesses
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should be licensed felt that licensing provisions should match those of non-sex industry
businesses in terms of the types of requirements and level of restrictiveness; sex industry
businesses should not be subject to more restrictive licensing requirements or levels of
enforcement than other businesses”.104 The result of imposing more restrictive conditions
is to suppress the positive benefits that licensing regimes can provide and encourage
workers to remain outside the licensed industry. “Workers who cannot work within the
confines of the legalized regime or do not want to do so are criminalized and subject to
the same repression imposed by a criminalized system”.105
A municipal license helps sex workers prove their employment, which affords
them a greater ability to participate in financial arrangements that are usually difficult for
those unable to document their work. The ability to rent an apartment or finance a car are
among the things that can easily be taken for granted. The professionalization of adult
services through licensing also improves their risk management strategies. The ability to
access safer working conditions was why the Bedford case was launched and informed
the Supreme Court decision to strike down the criminal provisions that made sex work
more dangerous. The dignity and freedom from exploitation that were envisioned in
CORP’s recommendations to the Fraser committee have tenuously occurred in
municipally licensed businesses but the benefits remain offset by the invasion of privacy
and expense of licensing.
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Municipal licensing requires sex workers to provide personal information that will
connect them to the adult services industry but without being able to know who can
access it and under what conditions it may be accessed. Stigma causes sex workers to be
vigilant about their privacy, often keeping their work secret from even those closest to
them. The stigma of having a record of employment in adult service could have an
unfavourable impact on future goals.
Licensing adult services is a windfall for cities but it comes from those who can
least afford it. In virtually all Canadian cities, the cost of licensing for a massage parlour
or an escort service ranks among the highest of the licenses offered. Further enhancing
licensing’s moneymaking potential for cities, is the requirement of individual employees
to be licensed. The cost is prohibitively high for some who would prefer to work in a
managed environment. The requirement for individual licenses also limits the ability of
travelling escorts to work legally in each city they visit. Most cities prohibit adult service
industry employees from working for more than one sex industry business and the cost of
obtaining a license for each city costs thousands per year. The drawbacks continue to
outweigh the benefits because of criminalization and an underlying policy to discourage
adult service businesses.
Exploring the benefits and drawbacks from the perspective of sex workers shows
immediately the compounding effect of federal and municipal policies and
pronouncements that seek to suppress the adult services industry and the sex workers
who ply their trade covertly within it. Criminalization coupled with goals of social
control do not allow licensing to benefit workers. To more fully respect the personal
autonomy of sex workers, their needs must be taken into consideration. Sex work has








continued even as the criminal law as become more onerous. Valverde reminds us that
we should learn from mistakes instead of repeating them:
One thing that the long history of temperance
movements teaches us is that governments can
encourage healthy behaviour but cannot use coercive
law to ban behaviours that many do not like but that
have always been with us. Criminalizing smoking
would just not work, for example.106
This is why the criminal law is not the best tool for regulating the sex trade. In a similar
vein, municipalities that treat sex industry businesses as undesirable and attempt to
discourage them with high-priced licenses also won’t succeed in suppressing the industry.
It merely leaves workers vulnerable as they are forced to work outside of the legalized
regime. Cohesion in policy from all levels of government is the only feasible solution,
and that policy must put the health and safety of sex workers ahead of a desire to
eliminate vices.
While the parliamentary debates over Bill C-36 still resonate, it almost seems
hard to consider that less law could effectively regulate decriminalized sex work. More so
that such law reform could address privacy concerns, allow sex workers more control
over their business, improve health and safety and not require an expensive license.
These are the hallmarks of a neutral licensing regime where sex work is decriminalized.
In the next chapter, New Zealand’s experience with decriminalization and licensing will
held up in contrast to the Canadian regime. While licensing offers little benefit under
current conditions in Canada, the New Zealand regime shows how a move to neutral
licensing under decriminalization can foster the exact benefits that Bedford sought to
achieve.
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CHAPTER 4 – LESSONS FROM NEW ZEALAND
INTRODUCTION
In 2003, New Zealand became the first country in the world to decriminalize
voluntary adult sex work in all venues.1 Prior to the passing of the Prostitution Reform
Act (PRA), selling sex was not illegal but “soliciting, brothel keeping, living on the
earnings of prostitution and procuring” were all prohibited.2 Sex workers operating out of
massage parlours in New Zealand faced similar hardships to the ones currently being
experienced by Canadian sex workers because “most female sex workers worked
disguised as masseuses”.3 While Canada is moving towards tougher criminal provisions
to control the sex trade through Bill C-36, the PRA took New Zealand in the opposite
direction. Repealing the criminal provisions has resulted in praise from multiple UN
bodies who advocate that other countries consider recognizing sex work as work and
providing those in the industry with the same occupational health and safety protections
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as other workers.4 New Zealand’s experience with law reform holds valuable lessons
from which Canada could learn.
While many of the activities that allow a person to make a living from sex work
remain criminalized in Canada, New Zealand has taken the position that a brothel is a
business and should be treated accordingly. Having established in chapter two that
Canadian municipalities would be the appropriate authorities for licensing decriminalized
brothels, this chapter details the experience of decriminalization in New Zealand in order
to develop guiding principles that could assist Canadian cities in developing effective
licensing regimes. As chapter three demonstrated, the licensing bylaws for massage
parlours and escort services should not be replicated and applied to decriminalized
brothels because they fail to address the privacy needs of sex workers and cause undue
financial hardship. New Zealand’s simple but well-reasoned approach allows sex workers
and their communities to coexist. In comparison to the Canadian municipal bylaws that
license massage parlours and escort agencies, the New Zealand legislation, at both
national and local levels, is concise, less onerous and easy to understand.5 The cost of
licensing is also much lower.6 While it would not be possible to replicate New Zealand’s
decriminalization legislation in its entirety, owing to different government structures,
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municipalities could easily adopt the framework of the New Zealand licensing regime to
regulate brothels in Canada. This chapter details the relevant sections of the Prostitution
Reform Act and advances the proposition that a similar regime would be appropriate for
enactment by Canadian municipalities. New Zealand has a simple regulatory regime that
allows sex workers greater control over their work environments while protecting their
privacy. This chapter will demonstrate not only why such a system is well reasoned but
also why it is precisely the type of system that Canada should consider.

PUSHING FOR THE DECRIMINALIZATION OF SEX WORK IN NEW ZEALAND

New Zealand’s decriminalization movement began as an informal gathering of
sex workers in 1987.7 They were frustrated by the conditions in massage parlours where
they worked covertly, not unlike the current situation of Canadian sex workers. The
Massage Parlours Act 1978 authorized police to apply for a court order to have any
masseuse’s employment terminated for committing an act of prostitution so that sex
workers working in massage parlour were forced to operate in a clandestine manner.8
Under the Act, employees of massage parlours could not have past convictions for drug
or prostitution offenses and police frequently checked staff listings to ensure
compliance.9 Despite having the enhanced safety of an indoor location, the power
imbalance created between the owners and the workers became untenable. With growing
concerns over the spread of AIDS, the police use of condoms as evidence to support
prostitution charges and an inability to exercise control over their work environment, the
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New Zealand Prostitutes Collective (NZPC) began to organize to lobby for law reform.10
The NZPC, from its humble beginnings would grow to become the driving force behind
decriminalization.
The NZPC remained largely informal because of the laws that criminalized sex
work, however the Ministry of Health saw them as a potential asset in delivering specific
health care initiatives for sex workers.11 For sex workers, the Ministry of Health
represented a potential ally: “a more benign government agency than the ones sex
workers were used to, that is, the police and justice system”.12 The NZPC was able to
present the issues that sex workers faced in a non-confrontational manner and the
Ministry of Health saw the NZPC as an organization that sex workers could trust. The
mutual benefits led to the NZPC becoming a publically funded organization to develop
an HIV prevention strategy tailored to the sex industry. For the government, it was an
opportunity to reach a vulnerable population. For the NZPC, it was an opportunity for sex
workers to take the lead on HIV prevention and ensure that “programs remained relevant
and sex-worker driven”.13 This unlikely alliance would provide sex workers with the
necessary leverage not only to improve their health, but also their working conditions.
Beginning in 1988, the NZPC received an annual grant of $50,000 NZD14 to
establish drop-in centres for sex workers, publish a magazine and distribute safe sex
supplies.15 The government funding offered considerable legitimacy to the NZPC and
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strengthened their ability to demand legal reform to improve the health and well being of
sex workers. The funding to pursue HIV prevention initiatives was a positive first step,
but their efforts were being hindered by the criminal law. The NZPC was instrumental in
dispensing condoms and information to sex workers but police were confiscating these
items and using them as evidence to arrest and charge sex workers.16 It meant that sex
workers were still reluctant to carry the one item that could protect them against HIV
infection. Criminalization also limited the number of sex workers who would otherwise
“step forward and act as peer educators and leaders in safe-sex programmes”.17
With the law defeating their mandate to facilitate HIV prevention, the NZPC
began the campaign that would eventually change the criminal law surrounding sex work.
The Ministry of Health was presented with an ultimatum – the NZPC would return the
funding that sustained HIV prevention programs unless an intergovernmental committee
was struck to examine the impact of the provisions criminalizing sex work.18 In an
affirmation of the important work that the NZPC was accomplishing, the Ministry of
Women’s Affairs, the police, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Justice came
together to produce a report. This collaboration brought all the stakeholders to the table
and the result was that “the decriminalisation of sex work was going to be taken
seriously”19, although law reform was still over a decade away. It also established a
relationship between the NZPC and the police that ended police collection of condoms as
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evidence of prostitution.20 Coming full circle from its initial attempt to curtail venereal
disease, New Zealand accepted the presence of sex work and made safe sex the law.21

IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES OF THE PRA

It is not the liberal nature of the PRA that makes it effective; it is the ease with
which people can understand the law and what is required to comply with it. In the
following section, three key principles of the legal regime are explored in detail. They
are: simplicity, privacy and cost. All of these principles are multi-faceted because
efficacy depends on the underlying purpose of a legal regime. Simplicity becomes moot
when the purpose of a law continues to moralize the sex industry instead of recognizing it
as work. Privacy is compromised when lawmakers fail to recognize the realities of the
stigma that sex workers face. Finally, cost can prevent sex workers from accessing safer
working conditions even when they are available.
New Zealand has struck a careful balance that Canadian lawmakers should take
note of because the law is designed to regulate sex work, not to condone it. Generations
of Canadian lawmakers have stuck to abolitionist rhetoric because they are befuddled
over how to regulate sex work without condoning it.22 The PRA denotes explicitly in its
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purpose that the intent of the Act is not to endorse or moralize.23 The PRA is an Act about
health and allowing sex workers to access the same scheme of occupational and human
rights as all other workers.24
While Canada’s political structure is different from New Zealand’s, the simplicity
of the PRA, the protection of privacy and setting fees that are on par with other
businesses, are all considerations that would enhance not only compliance with a regime
decriminalizing sex work in Canada, but also address the main concerns that sex workers,
currently working out of municipally licensed adult service businesses have raised. This
discussion will now broadly discuss how the New Zealand legislation and bylaws have
taken these concerns into consideration before moving to the more narrow discussion of
the provisions and how they are applied. While a ‘made in Canada’ approach to
decriminalization could become reality should the provisions of Bill C36 be found
unconstitutional, adopting these three notions from New Zealand’s experience can foster
a smoother transition into a new legal regime.
SIMPLICITY
Although there was considerable debate before the passing of the PRA, the
simplicity of New Zealand’s Brothel Operator’s certification under the Act was
deliberate, as it was intended to “encourage compliance”.25 The certification program was
not initially part of the Act but was developed by the Justice and Electoral Reform
Committee out of concern that decriminalization alone would not facilitate improved
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conditions for sex workers. Ultimately, the Committee did not propose an amendment to
the Bill but they reported their concerns, and suggested that a licensing regime would
help prevent power imbalances in the employer-employee relationship and would
discourage organized crime from infiltrating the industry.26 Although the committee only
included their conclusions on licensing, the Minister of Justice, Phil Goff, proposed an
amendment to the bill that added the requirement of the operator’s certificate.27 The
Brothel Operator’s Certificate became part of the Act when it was passed in June 2003.28
The Brothel Operator’s Certificate is not linked to any additional business
licensing requirements. This was deliberate. However, the Prostitution Law Reform
Committee did consider the desirability of linking the Brothel Operator’s Certificate with
municipal licensing. While a majority of the committee found that this would allow for
crosschecking those who hold certificates and business licenses, some members of the
committee felt that it would disadvantage operators of smaller enterprises.29 The
committee found that any measures taken to create a register of brothels could jeopardize
compliance with the certificate requirement and were, therefore, undesirable. The
majority view, however, was that the list of certificate holders should be accessible to
other government departments to allow for inspections.30
The Prostitution Law Reform Committee made only three other
recommendations, in addition to the one noted above. They found that requiring a
certificate to be renewed annually was inefficient, and suggested that certificates be valid
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for a period of three years.31 It also recommended that more information should be
provided to operators when a certificate is issued.32 Having considered the feedback from
certificate holders, the Committee saw that while certificate holders would welcome a
knowledge-based requirement to obtain a certificate, the preferred option of the
committee was to endorse information packs that would accompany an Operator’s
Certificate.33 The Committee found that a test may be more onerous and that providing
information about the law and an operator’s obligations was more feasible and would not
discourage applicants.34 They likened the information package to the ones already
provided to those obtaining a license to sell alcohol.35 The distribution of resources to
certificate holders does increase the costs but the Committee recommended that these
costs not be used as justification for increasing the fee; instead it should be borne by the
Department of Labour.36 The final recommendation was that inspections should be a
condition of issuing a certificate.37 This suggestion was largely in response to those who
were required to obtain a certificate but indicated that no checks were ever done to ensure
they had one.38 The Committee saw the Ministry of Labour as the appropriate body to
conduct inspections to ensure compliance. As with the information packages, the
Committee found that the cost should not be passed on to certificate holders.39
The recommendations of the Committee indicate that the main priorities with
operator’s certificates are improving administrative efficiency and providing better
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resources for sex workers. These are not indicative of problems with the system but
enhancements that can be made to improve the efficiency of the system.
Licensing at the local level has been more piecemeal, as not every territorial
authority has felt compelled to enact bylaws to regulate sex work. For some, it is simply
not an issue.40 For others, bylaws were passed in the event that regulating sex work
becomes necessary.41 Larger centres have adopted more robust regimes, some of which
include licensing, but have used broad and accessible criteria similar to the licensing
requirements for other businesses.42 There are no limits on the number of available
licenses so long as the proposed business complies with district plans, fees are paid and
any necessary inspections are passed. Once these conditions are met a business license
will be issued. The cost of additional licenses, beyond the operator’s certificate, has
discouraged some from entering the brothel business – or at least in an official capacity.
The PLRC reported that health and hygiene bylaws and the cost of a license, particularly
in Auckland, “has led some to remain massage parlours”.43 While this shows that
onerous regulation deters participation, the call for more rigorous monitoring of the PRA
and the bylaws of the territorial authorities came from participants in the certification and
licensing regimes.44 The lack of enforcement is largely owing to a “complaint driven”
system facilitated by multiple authorities.45
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The New Zealand system attempts to strike the delicate balance between allowing
only those certified to operate brothels and not dissuading potential operators from
opening legal brothels by imposing too-rigorous conditions. One study found that
credentials are rarely checked, and operators would be agreeable to a more onerous set of
conditions.46 The New Zealand Prostitutes Collective does not endorse adding conditions
to obtain an operator’s certificate because “making the system too onerous may result in
fewer operators applying for certification”.47 Should other countries seek to adopt a
similar system, New Zealand’s experience indicates that streamlining enforcement and
inspection is preferable. This would ensure that inspections are conducted more regularly,
and that sex industry businesses know which authority they will be dealing with.
Any government can create a licensing regime but for it to be successful the goals
must align with the needs of those it seeks to regulate. In New Zealand, the goal was to
enhance the health and safety of sex workers and the licensing system that was created is
“neutral”, in that it “licenses the sex industry in a similar way to other areas of
business”.48
The alternative “social control” method of licensing is embodied in licensing of
massage parlours and escort services in Canada and for the regulation of brothels in parts
of Australia.49 Indeed, the success of New Zealand’s “neutral” stance on licensing can be
best highlighted when compared to the “social control” model used in Queensland,
Australia. Brothels in Queensland were legalized by the Prostitution Act 1999.50 While
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New Zealand’s licensing regime is premised upon protecting and improving the health
and safety of sex workers, Queensland has taken the approach of controlling and
ultimately hoping to discourage brothels by making it difficult for them to obtain a
license.51 When the Queensland law was reviewed in 2004, there was great concern over
the two-tier system that had emerged.52 Illegal, unlicensed brothels were more prevalent
than licensed, legal brothels.53 Obtaining a license was an onerous process, and local
councils made securing planning approval so difficult that a majority of sex workers
remained outside the licensing regime.54 It was estimated that 75% of the sexual services
being provided in Queensland were illegal, owing largely to difficulty in obtaining a
license from the Prostitution Licensing Authority.55 Crofts and Summerfield found that
the Queensland system, being “administratively complex, intrusive and open to moralitybased decision making, as indicated by their lack of adherence to established protocols
for fair decision-making”, replicated the impacts of criminalization.56 While brothels had
the ability to operate as licensed businesses, the difficulty in achieving that status made it
less attractive. The aim to control commercial sex businesses in Queensland thus failed,
as they continued to operate illegally rather than engage with the complex network of
regulations.
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Queensland passed the Prostitution Amendment Act57 in 2001. Included were the
recommendations of the Crime and Misconduct Committee, who had assessed the prior
Act, and determined the legislation should be simplified.58 The amendment also sought to
prevent local councils from making morality-based decisions, as those decisions limited
the ability of commercial sex businesses to obtain the planning permissions required to
operate legally.59
The comparison of the two regimes clearly indicates that onerous regulation
discourages businesses from operating lawfully, even where they are permitted to do so.
Many who argue that licensing cannot be effective, fail to consider that the principles
used to develop the licensing regime can have a drastic impact on its effectiveness. While
the New Zealand licensing system remains simple, this is not an indication that it is not a
well-considered plan. In reality, the simplicity of the system is a result of considering all
the possible options and implications of making licensing more expensive and more
onerous, and rejecting them in favour of a system that is easy to participate in.
Anyone could read the PRA and understand with relative ease and precision what
is expected to comply with the law. While it is not above judicial scrutiny, and there is
certainly plenty about the changes created by the Act that the Courts can consider, the
language and organization of the PRA is designed to be accessible. Councils have created
licensing bylaws for businesses generally rather than singling out brothels for differential
treatment. The change in legal regime was supported with an occupational health and
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safety guide written for sex workers.60 The guide was a collaborative effort between the
Department of Labour and the NZPC, and a majority of sex workers surveyed indicated
that they had read it.61 New Zealand’s combination of plain language legislation and easy
to follow process had shaped the decriminalization of sex work in a way that other
counties should note. Not only is it simplistic, it works.

PRIVACY
Owing to the continued stigma attached to working in the sex trade, sex workers
are cautious about creating a paper trail that could later connect them to employment in
the sex industry. A licensing regime that considers the needs of sex workers is preferable
to one that treats them differently from other workers. The PRA protects the privacy of
sex workers in three ways: Small Owner-Operated Brothels are exempt from the
requirement to hold an operator’s certificate. The records for certificate holders,
applicants, and applicants for waivers of disqualification are only accessible by the
Registrar, police and the applicant.62 At the local level, not all territorial authorities
require an additional business license, none of which require licenses or registration of
individual workers.
As noted earlier, the PRA created two distinct classifications for brothels: the
Small Owner-Operated Brothel (SOOBs) which allows up to 4 sex workers to work
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together out of a residence so long as each worker retains the money they make from
selling sexual services, and the commercial brothels which require operator’s certificates
and in some cases, a business license. While the SOOBs have created contentious zoning
issues63, more often, they operate in a manner that goes unnoticed by the community
around them.64 SOOBs give sex workers more control over their work by allowing them
autonomy over their work. SOOBs provide the enhanced safety of working collectively
but sex workers still retain their earnings, and set the times and terms of their
transactions. By not requiring the SOOBs to be licensed or hold certificates, workers can
remain anonymous, work without fear that a record of their work in the sex trade will
scuttle future employment or educational pursuits, and they can exit the industry
whenever they choose. The removal of criminal law prohibitions on the sex trade is a
considerable help to those who wish to preserve their privacy. This is further enhanced by
New Zealand’s decision to classify smaller brothels as distinct from larger, commercial
operations.
While concern from the community was generally expressed in terms of moral
objection to the sex trade or the establishment of brothels, the picture that is painted of
dens of sin, red lights and associated behaviours has not been the reality under
decriminalization. Of the 53 territorial authorities that responded to the questionnaire sent
out by the PLRC, 30 admitted that no complaints had been received about brothels and
only 5 had received more than 10 complaints.65 A 2012 survey conducted in Australia
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also showed that brothels do not necessarily make bad neighbours. The results found that
“44% of those surveyed were unaware that they lived near a brothel” and more than half
“stated that the business had no impact (positive or negative) upon the local area”.66
With the requirement to hold an operator’s certificate limited to only those who
are in positions of power in commercial brothels, sex workers are exempt from providing
their personal information in this regard as well. What information is gathered from
applicants for an Operator’s Certificate is tightly controlled. There are strict conditions
under which the records of applicants and certificate holders can be accessed. Police
powers to search the register are limited to the investigation of crimes.67 Other than
general information for statistical purposes about the industry broadly, it is an offense to
obtain or use the information contained in the applications.68 The penalty is a fine of up
to $2000.69 The New Zealand government has taken great care to ensure that sex workers
are able to have confidence in the security of the system if they choose to participate in
management activities. This is far preferable to the conditions that prevailed prior to
decriminalization where police “kept a record of those working in the industry”.70

COST
Unlike the massage parlours and escort services in Canada, New Zealand does not
require individual licenses for those who work in brothels. A brothel is legal so long as
management acquires the requisite certificates, and a business license where required.
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While this allows anyone (over the age of 18) to engage in sex work, as previously noted,
it has not led to an explosion in the number of sex workers.71 Sex workers are also free to
leave the industry at any time. Not having to pay for a license means that no sex worker
feels compelled to work until the expiration of a license because of the cost incurred to
obtain it. The goal of the PRA was to protect the health and safety of workers, not to
condone the sex trade. By keeping fees low, the best interest of workers continues to be
the focus of efforts to regulate the trade.
The cost of an operator’s certificate is also not set prohibitively high. Keeping the
price affordable for those who require a certificate, and a municipal license, allows sex
workers the freedom to be entrepreneurs if they so choose. This also serves to help
prevent organized crime from infiltrating the industry, which can occur when licensing
costs are set prohibitively high.72
While the cost of a business license in Auckland is among the more expensive
licenses offered by the city, it remains well below the cost of comparable licenses in
Canada, such as those for massage parlours and escort services.73 For Canadian sex
workers who operate out of massage parlours and escort services, the requirement for a
license can also limit mobility. To work legally, a license is required in most cities. The
cost of the license, coupled with the conditions that require sex workers to work
exclusively for one employer, mean that travelling from city to city for work is virtually
impossible to do legally in Canada. In contrast, New Zealand, by not licensing individual
workers, permits them the freedom of mobility not only to work from various locations,
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but also the freedom to work in multiple locations. A New Zealand sex worker could
easily work from a commercial brothel while continuing to see clients independently,
because there are no rules that prevent this.
While money often plays a role in a person’s decision to work in the sex
industry,74 this should not make the cost more onerous than other professions. New
Zealand has adopted a system that takes cost into consideration. By assessing the effects
of the high cost of licensing, New Zealand has determined that it is preferable for sex
workers, the state and communities to have participation in a licensing regime, rather risk
having a two-tier system of legal and illegal brothels.
New Zealand’s simplistic scheme – one that respects the privacy of sex workers
and governs brothels akin to all other businesses - addresses the key concerns raised by
Canadian sex workers who work in municipally licensed adult businesses. This broad
discussion offers principles that could easily be adopted by Canadian lawmakers. These
three principles will be further illuminated in the section that follows, which will offer a
more detailed look at the licensing functions in both the PRA and through Auckland
Council’s local bylaws.

BROTHELS & LICENSING UNDER THE PRA
The PRA lays out a majority of the rules for how sex work is permitted to occur
under a decriminalized regime. While some predicted an explosion in the number of sex
workers post-decriminalization, this assertion cannot be supported by research conducted
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after the enactment of the law.75 In fact, the conclusions of the Prostitution Law Reform
Committee, which was created by s. 43 of the PRA to study the effects of
decriminalization, found that decriminalization had improved working conditions,
facilitated better relationships with police and better protects the rights of sex workers.76
From human rights, to labour, to health, sex workers in New Zealand now operate within
the same framework as workers in other sectors.77
The positive impacts of the New Zealand legislation are not only encouraging, but
should also prompt any country attempting sex work law reform to consider adopting a
similar model, as well as the reasoning behind it. As Brock asserts:
[h]aving a labour rights framework in place means
that, should decriminalization actually occur, there
is already an existing mechanism for organizing sex
work, thereby making sex workers less unprepared
for and vulnerable to new forms of legal
regulation.78
New Zealand’s choice to focus more on work, rather than sex, has actually facilitated
greater compliance with the reforms enacted by the PRA.
Under the PRA, a brothel is defined as a place customarily used for prostitution.
However, this exempts “premises at which accommodation is normally provided on a
commercial basis if the prostitution occurs under an arrangement initiated elsewhere”.79
This effectively ensures that hotels are not classified as being in the business of
prostitution and exempts them from the regulations required of commercial brothels.
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The PRA also divides brothels into two distinct categories, the main differences
being size and licensing requirements. Small owner-operated brothels allow for up to four
sex workers to work together in one location, usually a private residence, so long as each
sex worker retains the money received for sexual services rendered.80 Small OwnerOperated Brothels (SOOBs) are not required to have an operator’s certificate because
none of the workers is considered an operator.81 Larger, commercial brothels are
managed venues where more than 5 sex workers can be employed. The operators of
commercial brothels are required to be licensed by obtaining an operator’s certificate.
However, there are no licensing requirements for individual workers.82
When compared to some of the municipal licensing regimes adopted by Canadian
cities to regulate massage parlours and escort services, New Zealand’s system of
operator’s certification is quite simple. Under the PRA, anyone who “operates, controls
or manages” a commercial sex business must apply for a certificate. This includes
anyone with the authority to determine: “when or where a sex worker works, the
conditions under which they work and remuneration for their work”.83 Applicants for
operator’s certificates must apply to the Registrar of the District Court with the
prescribed form, fee, a photocopy of their identification, and a photo for the certificate.84
So long as the aforementioned items are presented, and the applicant is over 18 and not
disqualified under the conditions in s. 36 of the PRA, the Registrar is obliged to issue the
operator’s certificate.85 An operator’s certificate can be denied only where the applicant
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has been convicted of one or more of the criminal offenses listed in s. 36.86 The crimes
that could lead to a denial are primarily related to violence, organized crime, drugs, and
money laundering, which carry sentences of imprisonment of more than 2 years.87 Those
who do not qualify because of past crimes can apply for a waiver of disqualification,
which will be issued at the discretion of a District Court Judge and the Commissioner of
Police upon review of the application.88
An operator’s certificate is subject to annual renewal.89 The cost and application
process remains the same as the initial application.90 For a renewal that is delayed or
otherwise does not arrive before the expiration of the previous certificate, the previous
certificate remains valid until the renewal is processed.91 Those who are required to hold
certificates must be able to produce them upon request of the Police, be it immediately, or
within 24 hours.92 Failure to show a license can result in a fine of up to $2000.93 The fine
for operating a brothel without a certificate can be as high as $10,000. Operators have
largely complied with the certification requirement. The Prostitution Law Reform
Committee noted that only three charges had been laid, one of which resulted in a
conviction while the other two were withdrawn.94
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TERRITORIAL AUTHORITY LICENSING BYLAWS

New Zealand has a “unitary system of government” which delegates powers to
local governments through legislation.95 While this arrangement may seem
straightforward, the structure of local authority varies throughout the country. There are
78 local authorities that consist of “eleven regional councils, twelve city councils, 54
district councils and the Auckland Council”.96 To complicate matters further, they do not
all have the same authority. Only the Auckland Council, the City Councils and the
District Councils are considered territorial authorities.97 Of the 67 territorial authorities,
six also hold regional council authority, which means that legislation must be specific in
delegating powers to the correct source.98 The territorial authorities derive a majority of
their powers from the Local Government Act 2002.99 Other acts, such as the Prostitution
Reform Act 2003, contain sections that also delegate specific matters to be dealt with at a
local level.100
In addition to obtaining an operator’s certificate, seven of New Zealand’s
territorial authorities have enacted bylaws that require brothels to acquire a business
license.101 The Local Government Act 2002 (LGA), which repealed many of the
provisions of the predecessor Act of 1974, holds public participation in local democracy
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as one of its core values.102 Bylaws cannot be made without “extensive consultations with
its community and other affected parties”.103 In addition, all bylaws enacted are required
to be reviewed after five years.104 The Prostitution Law Reform Committee (PLRC)
found that even though the PRA delegated the specific responsibilities of regulating the
location and permissible signage for brothels to local authorities, much of the debate that
occurred “revolved around questions of morality, and was often expressed in terms of
strong emotion”.105 Despite the public outcry, “seven territorial authorities have
established a licensing regime for brothels by way of bylaws under the LGA and the
Health Act 1956”.106
Auckland Council is the largest regional council, and governs a population of
1,415,550 people.107 The council consists of “two complementary decision making
parts”.108 The mayor (elected at large) is the head of the governing body, which also
includes a complement of members elected from twenty wards.109 There are also 21 local
boards, each with five to nine elected representatives.110 The governing body focuses on
“big picture” issues and decisions affecting the region, while the local boards handle
issues in their respective communities.111 Auckland Council is currently reviewing
bylaws for brothels and commercial sex premises and some local boards have passed
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licensing bylaws, which means the rules for operating a brothel legally are closely tied to
location.112 Under the umbrella of Auckland Council, local boards in the North Shore,
Manukau, Auckland City and Rodney have bylaws requiring brothels to obtain a
license.113
Those seeking to operate a brothel require an Operator’s Certificate from the
Ministry of Justice, as detailed above. Auckland Council requires that all potential
businesses consult with a planning officer to ensure that the proposed business falls
within a permitted zone and to ascertain the “operating requirements in the area,
including parking and lighting”.114 If a new building is to be constructed, or an existing
one altered, building consent is also required.115 These steps are required of all
businesses. They are not specific to brothels. Additional licenses are required for serving
food or alcohol, but Auckland Council no longer requires brothel operators to obtain a
“health protection” license.116
With the correct forms and required fees, Auckland City has made the process of
licensing a brothel akin to opening any other business. The cost of a brothel license is a
one-time application fee of $181 and an annual fee of $708.117 Auckland City also
permits the transfer of an existing brothel license for a fee of $99.118 Auckland’s Brothel
and Commercial sex premises bylaw indicates that a license will be granted upon
satisfaction of the application and payment of the fee so long as the conditions of the
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bylaw are met.119 There is no proscribed limit on the number of brothel licenses that can
be issued. Before a new license is issued, or an existing license is transferred or renewed,
an inspection must be completed by an “authorised officer” to ensure compliance with
city bylaws, as well as “the Health Act 1956120, the Building Act 1991121 and the Building
Regulations 1992”.122
Auckland’s brothel bylaw also sets out the rules for signage123 and operational
health and safety.124 Signage was delegated to the territorial authorities by the PRA.125 In
addition to the specific signage rules for brothels in the brothel bylaw, they must also
comply with the rules about signage in Part 27 of Auckland’s signage bylaw that applies
to all signs in the city.126 The health and safety requirements in the bylaw compel brothel
owners to provide clean, safe working environments for sex workers and their clients. To
be in compliance with the bylaw (echoing the PRA), operators must make an effort to
provide health information and safe sex supplies for workers and clients.127
Auckland’s brothel bylaw, like the PRA, is primarily concerned with ensuring that
the operation of brothels is undertaken in a safe, unobtrusive manner. Local governments
do not have the authority to prohibit brothels or sex work because they are not permitted
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to enact bylaws that contravene the intention of the PRA to make sex work safer.128 The
policies and bylaws are currently undergoing review in an attempt to create a more
unified strategy for regulating brothels throughout Auckland Council’s jurisdiction.129
The dynamics of the sex trade are complicated. The regulation does not have to
be. More than a decade of decriminalization in New Zealand has shown that simple rules,
that consider the privacy concerns and fees that are not punitive in nature, can
successfully encourage compliance with the law, while advancing the rights of sex
workers. The certification regime has allowed brothels to open legally without setting
strict conditions. Exempting SOOBs from licensing provides anonymity from the state
and autonomy for sex workers. The registry of who holds and applies for an Operator’s
Certificates is protected from being easily accessed and the requirement to hold a
business license varies by location, with some not requiring one at all. This is instructive
to lawmakers elsewhere. Sex work can be decriminalized and regulated at the local level
to provide individualized solutions for communities without creating a hierarchy of legal
and illegal enterprises.

CONCLUSION
When it comes to regulating decriminalized brothels, New Zealand has proven
that less is more. The PRA’s carefully considered structure for the decriminalization of
sex work has resulted in better conditions for sex workers because the Act puts the rights
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of sex workers at the forefront of its intent.130 The doomsday scenarios that were
predicted by those who opposed decriminalizing the sex trade have not come to
fruition.131 Much of the success of the PRA comes from what it does not do. The PRA
does not condone or encourage sex work, but nor does it prohibit it. The PRA does not
make sex work more dangerous; it does not create a system so complex or expensive that
workers are unable to comply with its requirements; it does not jeopardize future
endeavors by linking sex workers to a paper trail indicating employment in the sex trade;
and it does not treat sex work differently from other forms of employment or business.
By taking a “neutral” position in licensing, instead of the “social control” stance, New
Zealand has created a regime that encourages brothels to operate legally and avoids the
pitfalls that allow a two-tier system of legal and illegal brothels to flourish as has
occurred elsewhere.
This chapter shows that New Zealand has managed to address the concerns that
sex workers in Canada have about their work. It has done so through both the
decriminalization of sex work and the carefully constructed rules that now govern the
industry. The principles of the New Zealand licensing regime, including both the
operator’s certification and local licensing requirements, have used simple and accessible
rules to engage sex workers while respecting their privacy, and not using them as a means
to raise revenue to fill municipal coffers. The recommendations of the Prostitution Law
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Reform Committee indicating that more resources should be provided but without
passing on the additional costs should be instructive to lawmakers elsewhere.
The different systems of government that New Zealand and Canada have mean
that it would be difficult to simply copy the provisions of the PRA for Canada. What is
clear, is that the system that New Zealand has created under the PRA and the bylaws of
the territorial authorities is functional, encourages compliance and improves conditions in
the sex trade. The principles of the system should not be overlooked by Canadian
legislators at all levels, particularly in light of the questionable constitutionality of Bill C36.





 



CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
The contrast between the regulatory regimes in Canada and New Zealand
highlights the disparities in working conditions for sex workers. In Canada,
municipalities are “eager to control the indoor sex trade through a myriad of zoning and
licensing requirements aimed at being prohibitive in one sense and restrictive in
another”.1 New Zealand’s experience with legal reform shows that professionalizing the
sex industry and permitting brothels to operate can bring about more positive results than
attempts to control and suppress the sex trade. Canada’s struggle to regulate the sex trade,
both overtly at the federal level and covertly at the municipal level, has been debated by
committees, courts and parliament, but has led to little meaningful change. That sex
workers and their advocates were largely ignored in the creation of the new criminal
provisions means that we have not yet reached a satisfactory solution. As Cheryl Auger
wrote: “Bill C-36 treats anyone involved in sex work as though they are a social problem
and ignores sex workers' right to security of person”.2
The answer to protecting rights, community cohesion and ensuring health and
safety standards begins with treating sex work as work. In Hrabchak3, Devine J. pointed
to the language used in by-laws as being “laboured”, as if using the language of work
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could distinguish adult services from the criminal prohibitions on prostitution.4 In that
case, the owner of an unlicensed escort agency successfully argued that offers of sexual
services were not within the ambit of the bylaw regulating businesses providing
companionship, and therefore he could not be convicted of running a dating and escort
service without a license.5 The short decision details the limits of municipal authority but
points to the “Alice-in-wonderland state of the law”.6 To avoid venturing further down
this rabbit hole, reform at the federal level is necessary to allow municipalities the ability
to license (and zone) brothels.
The Bedford Court was clear that the laws should not put sex workers at greater
risk and this must be taken into account by municipal lawmakers. Adopting new
regulations should always involve those most affected: “[s]ex workers have a unique
insight and expertise regarding their industry, the role it plays in Canadian society, and
the ways in which regulatory regimes will impact their business”.7 The process of
creating new bylaws aimed at regulating brothels should involve sex workers, in the same
way that legal reform around any other issue would consult with those most affected. The
labour of sex workers should not be devalued as an excuse for excluding their voices.
Municipal lawmakers need to move beyond morality and address the labour that is really
at stake.
These five recommendations are drawn from the research showing that
municipalities are capable of creating licensing regimes which, when devised in
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conjunction with workers, facilitate compliance and protect the rights affirmed by the
Supreme Court in Bedford. These recommendations offer guidance on how to strike the
careful and necessary balance between sex workers and the communities in which they
live. Sex workers and their communities will benefit from licensing regimes that set
reasonable fees, allow specific exemptions from licensing, protect privacy, deal with past
criminal history of license applicants and consult with sex workers throughout the
process. Creating regulations that sex workers can abide by not only makes their work
safer, but also avoids discord in the community.
In evaluating Canada’s criminal laws on sex work, the Fraser Committee weighed
all possible options to determine the advantages and disadvantages. The following
statement was made in relation to decriminalization coupled with municipal licensing:
Among the advantages seen in this approach
were the relative ease of enforcement; the
acceptance of prostitution as a business and
an improved self-image of prostitutes
operating such enterprises; an attendant
reduction of the reliance of pimps and other
exploiters; better maintenance of public
health; and increased revenue to municipal
governments from license fees.8
While recognizing that leaving the design of such regulations solely to municipalities
would result in piecemeal regulation, with adequate consultation this is not an
insurmountable challenge. New Zealand’s experience demonstrates that it is possible to
achieve effective regulation even if it is inconsistent across jurisdictions.
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REASONABLE FEES
In setting the cost of a license, municipalities need to be cognizant of the delicate
balance that needs to be struck. Fees that are too high discourage or impede those who
would otherwise participate in the licensing regime. As Bedford applicant Valerie Scott
explained following the Ontario Court of Appeal decision: “[m]unicipalities need to
ensure that licenses are a reasonable fee. If they charge thousands of dollars per year, sex
workers will not be able to afford a license but organized crime will”.9 As demonstrated
in Chapter 2, high licensing fees for the adult service sector are very much a reality in
Canada.10 Using the same philosophy to set fees for brothels would be a mistake, as
shown by the development of the two-tier system of legal and illegal brothels that
occurred in Queensland, Australia. When fees are too high, the prevalence of illegal
brothels will flourish. This is an undesirable outcome of licensing that can be avoided.
The sex trade will continue to exist under a licensing regime designed for social
control. The fact that sexual services are being provided in licensed massage parlours is
evidence of this. While municipalities have profited from the licensing fees for adult
service businesses and their individual workers, at the same time they impose harsher
conditions on these same businesses. Montreal Mayor Denis Coderre, has been vocal in
his opposition to crackdown on massage parlours, while Toronto amended their bylaw to
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restrict the number of licenses issued.11 Charging these businesses higher licensing fees
has not stopped them from opening, but it has created hardships for those who work in
the industry. Adopting a neutral standpoint for licensing and encouraging participation
yields better results for both workers and the community.
Licensing fees should be set at a level that is comparable to other businesses of a
similar size.12 We have seen that sexual service providers continue to persist even when
fees are set punitively high and despite the denial of health and safety regulation. The
ability of municipalities to raise revenues is severely constrained.13 While this can be
appreciated, it is also concerning that municipalities have used social control methods to
regulate adult services so that the most marginalized are seen as a source of profit.

EXEMPTIONS FROM LICENSING
The desire to exert control over the adult services industry is evident in Canadian
municipal bylaws. By limiting the number of available licenses, and requiring each
individual employee to also be licensed, it is clear that cities want to discourage the
growth of the adult services industry. For example, Toronto limits the number of licenses
available to owners of body-rub parlours to 25.14 In contrast, New Zealand has taken a
neutral stance to licensing adult businesses and has opted for less restrictive regulations.
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The permissive attitude focuses on health and safety, and sets no limits on the number of
sex industry businesses, including brothels.15 The distinction between Commercial
brothels and Small Owner-Operated Brothels (SOOBs) allows for regulations that are
better tailored to the actual nature of the business. While an unlimited number of
available licenses could lead to a proliferation of brothels, this has not been the case. In
fact, many commercial brothels have closed because they were unable to compete for
business.16
To create a municipal licensing regime for brothels that sex workers can and will
participate in, there need to be reasonable exemptions from licensing. While it may sound
counter-intuitive to have less stringent regulation, the New Zealand system shows how it
can function effectively. All of New Zealand’s commercial brothels require an Operator’s
Certificate, however, there are no license requirements for individual sex workers in their
employ or for SOOBs. The territorial authority where the brothel seeks to operate
determines business licensing requirements for brothels; and in some cases, the territorial
authorities have not felt the need to enact licensing regimes for brothels.
The primary exemption for licensing should be for individual workers.17
Regardless of the location in which they work, individual licenses are costly and provide
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little value to workers in return.18 Not requiring individual workers to obtain a license
also addresses many of the privacy concerns sex workers have by providing them with
the anonymity to work in the industry without the paper trail. Individual workers in New
Zealand are not required to obtain a license and the PRA carefully considered multiple
options with the input of workers. It was preferable to have safe, regulated brothels than
to control and monitor individuals who may choose to sell sex.

PRIVACY PROTECTION
Municipal licensing should strive to protect the privacy of each person, regardless
of the reason for providing personal information. For sex workers, the stakes are often
higher. The stigma associated with sex work, which does not automatically disappear
under decriminalization, means that workers have more nuanced reasons for secrecy
around their profession. Not requiring that individual workers be licensed to work in
brothels dramatically improves their privacy.
For those required to obtain licenses to operate commercial brothels, personal
information should be subject to strict requirements. Sex workers should know up front
who can access their application and for what reasons. The PRA carefully lays out
guidelines on personal information and this should be replicated within a municipal
licensing regime so that anyone applying for a license has confidence in the integrity of
the system. Having all this information in advance is the only fair way to ask a person to
submit personal information that will associate them with having worked in the sex trade.
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DEALING WITH PAST CONVICTIONS
Opportunities for workers to move from street-based work to the better security of
an indoor venue should not be thwarted for past prostitution convictions. In addition to
not requiring licenses for individual workers, sex workers who wish to operate their own
sex industry businesses should not be barred from doing so. This requires careful
consideration of which Criminal Code offenses should prevent a business license from
being issued. Both police and sex workers should play a role in determining what
offences should disqualify a person. These two groups should also advise on how to
create a process for appeals or for having a personalized assessment in the case of past
convictions.
The current practice of licensing body rub parlours in Toronto appoints the Chief
of Police as a decision maker on all license applications.19 There are no indications of
what kind of criminal record would preclude a successful license application or how
discretion is exercised. This means each applicant must be scrutinized instead of allowing
them the benefit of a list of disqualifying offences that would indicate grounds on which
their application will be refused.
New Zealand developed a list of criminal convictions that make a person
ineligible for a Brothel Operator’s Certificate.20 The crimes that can disqualify an
applicant mainly pertain to offences of violence, drugs and fraud.21 By providing a
detailed list with section numbers, applicants are able to know in advance if they may be


19

Toronto Licensing Bylaw, supra note 11 at s 334.
New Zealand, Ministry of Justice, Report of the Prostitution Law Review Committee on the Operation of
the Prostitution Reform Act 2003 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2008) online:
<http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy/commercial-property-and-regulatory/prostitution/prostitution-lawreview-committee/publications/plrc-report> at s 6.2.2 [PLRC Report].
21
Ibid; Prostitution Reform Act 2003 (NZ), 2003/28 at s 37: Waivers of disqualification can be obtained
under certain circumstances by applying to the Registrar of the Auckland District Court.
20





 


refused. The system provides clarity for applicants and is more administratively efficient
because applicants are better informed about whether or not they will qualify for a
certificate or not. New Zealand may have devised an effective solution, or perhaps sex
workers and police could suggest improvements. Regardless, both groups need to be
involved and the assessment criteria should be laid out in full for applicants, before they
apply. 

CONSULTATION WITH THE INDUSTRY
It would be unimaginable for a government to create regulations for an industry
without consulting with those who work within it. Failing to acknowledge sex work as
work has meant years of criminal laws that have only made the sex trade more dangerous.
The voices of sex workers were largely ignored in the creation of the Protection of
Communities and Exploited Persons Act.22 By failing to listen to sex workers, the enacted
law fails to acknowledge the realities of the sex trade.
The benefit of municipal law is that it can be crafted to reflect the unique needs of
the community. While the risk is of piecemeal policy that varies from city to city, the
creation of brothel licensing bylaws represents an opportunity to craft individual
solutions in conjunction with community stakeholders and sex workers. Effective brothel
licensing regimes cannot be created without the input of sex workers and the
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organizations that advocate for their rights. The goal is to create a licensing regime that
sex workers can and will participate in, so they should have a say in the creation of the
regulations so that regulation reflects the reality of the industry. This means not only
allowing sex workers to have a voice in the conversation but also that their voices be
heard. It is vital that they be consulted: “[s]ex workers must be at the centre of planning
and decision-making about the criminal law, as well as zoning and licensing issues,
employment law and other regulatory issues that will impact their work and their lives”.23
It is not enough to merely consult, but to consult effectively.
Sex workers deserve an opportunity to express their views to municipal
lawmakers and consideration should be given to their unique needs for privacy.
Municipalities should schedule consultations with sex workers and their advocacy
organizations that are closed to the public. This will facilitate both participation and frank
discussion. This will also provide municipalities to acquire first-hand knowledge of how
the sex trade operates within the community and ask for solutions from those most
affected. Sex workers should be able to attend such meetings without fear of judgment or
reprisal, and without having to give their names. Consultations that are open to the public
may draw some members of the sex work community but they may choose not to identify
themselves or to speak up because of the stigma that is attached to their work.
Public consultation is also necessary and vital to balancing the concerns of the
community with the needs of sex workers. Municipalities should involve sex workers
who are comfortable speaking publicly as well as ally organizations to address
community concerns. Misconceptions about the sex trade may be at the heart of


23

Sex Workers United Against Violence et al, My Work Should not Cost Me my Life (Vancouver: Pivot,
2014) online: <http://www.pivotlegal.org/my_work> at 18 accessed 15 February 2015.





 


resident’s concerns and having those concerns addressed by those with extensive
knowledge of the sex trade and research on the industry could foster better policy and
community cohesiveness. While it is critical that “[s] ex workers, sex worker advocacy
groups, and other community organizations providing services to sex workers are
consulted in formulating legal and policy changes that affect sex workers”, they can also
serve as valuable liaisons to the community.24 Introducing decriminalized, municipally
licensed brothels into a community, as New Zealand has shown us, can be done without
disrupting neighbourhood cohesion.
Criminalizing sex work is easy. Building inclusive communities that involve sex
workers in the policy-making that affects them requires effort. While New Zealand offers
a simple and successful example of how the decriminalization of sex work can be
enacted, it is because much time and consideration went into crafting the laws,
regulations and bylaws that now govern the sex trade. Given the constitutionally
questionable criminal regime that was recently enacted in Canada, municipalities should
prepare themselves for how they will engage with sex workers should the new law have a
short tenure. It is certainly possible that an even stricter form of criminalization could be
enacted, however, the evidence clearly indicates that the regulation of sex work,
beginning at the municipal level, could have the most positive impact on the lives of sex
workers.
If the current criminal regime is rejected and sex work is decriminalized in
Canada, not all the work will be done at the municipal level. While it falls outside of the
scope of this thesis, it is important to acknowledge that provincial governments will also
have a role to play. The groundwork that needs to be done by municipalities around to
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develop licensing and zoning regulations is merely the beginning. As Cheryl Auger of
Maggie’s points out: “licenses do not replace labor laws”.25 Labour, health and safety
regulations all fall within provincial jurisdiction so co-operation will be necessary to
create a cohesive, easy to navigate system that protects the rights of sex workers.
There is little reason that consultation and the lowering of fees could not be
contemplated now. Building relationships between city counsels and the sex work
community will take an effort on the part of both parties. There is little reason why this
dialogue should not commence sooner rather than later. It serves to put municipalities in
a better position to create bylaws with a clear, local perspective. It also allows sex
workers to provide their municipalities with input as to their needs and concerns. Keeping
high licensing fees in place cannot be justified, particularly in cities which restrict the
number of licenses they grant. It reinforces the stigma that adult service businesses are
undesirable, cause nuisance and require strict controls. It is undeniable that it is easier to
do a lot of work over time instead of trying to manage an abundance of work in a short
period. If cities undertake to foster relations and lower fees now, they will be more
successful at balancing the concerns of the community with needs of sex workers if the
legal landscape changes again.

CONCLUSION
Even with the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act now
included in the Criminal Code, now is the time for planning the municipal regulation of
decriminalized brothels. With such “grave concerns” over the new law it is precisely the
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right time to have discussions about how to improve sex work policy in Canada.26 This
thesis has established why municipal regulation of decriminalized brothels is the most
effective way forward; how current licensing regimes for adult service providers are
insufficient and would need to adapt; and how New Zealand changed their legal regime
and analysis of the decriminalized system. From this, we can draw guiding principles to
assist municipalities in creating local licensing solutions that are tailored to the specific
needs of each community. With the proper regulation at both the municipal and
provincial levels, sex workers can benefit from legislation that treats sex work as work
and affords the benefits of recognized employment. In the meantime, municipalities
could start by consulting with sex workers and those in the adult service industry to
improve the current licensing bylaws based on these same principles.



Allowing the professionalization of the industry, treating it the same as other
industries garners more compliance and a less disruptive way for the sex trade to operate.
For this to occur, this thesis has promoted two closely linked principles: the recognition
of labour as it applies to sex work, and neutral licensing regimes that treat sex work akin
to other industries. If Canada is to achieve the success of New Zealand in decriminalizing
sex work, decriminalization must be coupled with a neutral stance in regulation. This will
allow for the same strong perception of rights that empowers workers in New Zealand.27
Although it is a dramatic shift from the status quo, “a galvanizing force in support of
labour legitimacy could effect lasting social change”.28
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The situation in New Zealand was similar prior to decriminalization. In interviews
with community agencies following the change in legal regime a church leader described
the New Zealand situation in a manner that accurately reflects the current situation in
Canada:
The public morality and public discourse had
previously been a double standard. On the one
hand, this was saying this [sex work] is illegal and
they [sex workers] are criminals. On the other hand,
everyone knew and almost accepted it was going on
behind closed doors. I think it is better for it to be
honestly recognised as happening, whether people
like it or not.29
New Zealand managed to strike the proper balances without the benefit of example.
Canada only benefits from the experiences of this legal change.
It is also abundantly clear that the current bylaws regulating adult service
businesses are creating hardships that can be alleviated by providing better information to
workers, particularly given the potential implications of the new criminal provisions. The
issues of cost and privacy should also be addressed. This provides municipalities the
opportunity to open communication within the industry that can foster better
understanding and better working relationships.
Stigma is an issue that will not disappear with decriminalization and that is why it
is important to ensure both adult service providers and sex workers are assured privacy
protections. Municipal licensing creates a paper trail linking a person with their
employment in the sex industry. Workers fear that this will have consequences that will
impact future goals. Careful attention to privacy concerns is key to creating a licensing
regime that sex workers will participate in. Clear guidelines that establish who can access
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the information, under what circumstances and the penalty for inappropriate access would
also allow workers to be better informed.
A licensing regime can only be effective if there is participation. Current
municipal licensing fees for both the owners/operators of adult service businesses and for
individual employees are disproportionate to the fees charged to other businesses. While
the discussion has highlighted that this is a hallmark of a social control licensing regime,
it creates significant hardships for those working in the adult industry. First, the costs are
higher than other industries. Second, the cost of a license is simply too expensive for
some. Third, the cost and structure of licensing regimes can restrict the mobility of those
who travel for work.
The experiences of New Zealand provide a roadmap of how sex work can be
decriminalized and regulated without the situation dissolving into chaos or leading to
significant growth of the sex industry. While the courts have weighed in over matters of
zoning, the licensing regime, administered through the Ministry of Justice and at the local
level, has been successful in creating better work environments, facilitating the rights of
workers and respecting the autonomy of those who sell sex for a living.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR REFORM AT THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL
The comparison of how Canada and New Zealand regulate sex work shows the
stark contrast of the situations endured by workers. While the removal of criminal
sanctions is primary, the introduction of neutral municipal licensing is equally important.
The current social control licensing regime used for body rub parlours and escort services
would continue to replicate the conditions of criminalization even if the criminal
provisions were removed. Striking the right balance means not just decriminalizing the








sex trade, but allowing it to professionalize and operate just like any other business.
Canada has significant challenges to face if this is to occur but New Zealand can serve as
a touchstone, not just for decriminalization but for the carefully constructed regulations
that were put in place to govern the sex trade.
By contrasting the two regimes, five guiding principles can be drawn that will
assist Canadian municipalities in developing licensing regimes for brothels should
decriminalization occur. The creation of an effective licensing regime will provide for:
reasonable fees; exemptions from licensing; privacy protections; does not exclude
workers based on past prostitution charges; and extensive consultation with sex workers.
More law is not the answer. The nuances of the sex industry, which are discussed
throughout this thesis, indicate that too much regulation will not lead to an effective
solution. If the desire to place strict parameters on the sex trade informs the creation of
licensing bylaws, they will be doomed to fail. At the very heart of what can be learned
from New Zealand is that neutral licensing regimes have proven more effective. If
municipalities commit to treating sex work akin to other businesses, then the principles
that follow should lead them to the development of a licensing regime that sex workers
will participate in and will not cause undue community discord.
Setting reasonable fees is critical. As Lowman warns: “The unintended
consequence is a pattern of law enforcement that allows the municipalities and the
entrepreneurs who pay their license fees to corner the sex trade market, and exact higher
prices”.30 Keeping the cost of a license for a brothel consistent with the pricing for other
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licenses allows sex workers to be in control of their industry. It allows them to participate
without the need for a third party to finance them.
Allowing exemptions from licensing protects privacy and autonomy for workers
who wish to work in smaller, informal venues, while not excluding them from the safety
measures such as working with others. To further protect the privacy of workers,
municipalities should not institute a requirement for individual licenses. As workers
indicate that licenses are poor value and they receive little in return for their fee and
furnishing their personal information. This is indicative of an area where municipalities
can improve immediately and instead of waiting to adopt new policies for brothels. Since
municipalities have no need to identify who is employed in the sex trade, there should be
no requirement for an individual license, which satisfies the concerns of workers over the
cost of licensing and their personal information being collected.
For sex workers, it is imperative that previous convictions for sex work not
become barriers to licensing a brothel under decriminalization. While some criminal
offenses should preclude a person from operating a brothel, there must be a clear
indication of which offences will disqualify an applicant. There should also be a clear
process for appeal or obtaining special permission to obtain a license when a person has a
past conviction. A criminal record check is permissible for someone who seeks a license
to operate a brothel, however only predetermined offenses should have no bearing on
whether or not a person qualifies to work in a brothel. Perhaps most critically, sex
workers should be involved in the creation of the rules that will be imposed on them.
The guidance that sex workers can provide about their industry and how it
operates needs to inform municipal lawmakers so that the licensing regime that is created,









reflects the reality of the industry. Sex workers are very experienced in working under a
set of rules that are not designed for them. They are in the best position to “define how
their trade should be supervised”.31 Municipalities would be best served to consider this
in light of current bylaws for body rub parlours and escort services. Instead of one side
holding the power and the other holding the knowledge, cities and workers need to
cooperate to find the right solutions.
These principles reflect recommendations made by previous studies, concerns of
sex workers about municipal regulation and lessons from New Zealand’s experience of
decriminalization. If municipalities can approach the licensing of brothels with an open
mind to the experiences of workers and the guidance from lawmakers in New Zealand,
there is no reason why municipalities could not enact licensing regimes that respect both
workers and the communities in which they live.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
Even before Bill C-36 was introduced, it was clear that any attempt to replicate
the Swedish law criminalizing the clients of sex workers was going to be met with
resistance. Brenda Cossman criticized the notion in the month following the Bedford
decision: “[t]he idea that the Nordic model is some fantastic alternative, that it's going to
uphold and protect the rights of prostitutes while going after their evil clients and pimps
is a fallacy”.32 This is the exact fallacy that the Federal Government has enacted. The
Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act is now part of the Criminal Code
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but the provisions it adds remain contentious and the passing of the bill into law does not
appear to have quelled the debate. The newly sworn-in Toronto city council wasted no
time in speaking out against the Federal Government’s new criminal provisions. On their
first day in office, 25 Councilors, representing all areas of the city and a wide array of
political views, signed a letter urging Ontario Premier Kathleen Wynne to refer the
legislation to the Ontario Court of Appeal to determine if it passes constitutional
muster.33
The Premier responded with a statement indicating she was also concerned about
the new criminal laws.34 The Premier wrote: “I am left with grave concern that the socalled Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act will protect neither
exploited persons nor communities”.35 While stopping short of referring the legislation to
the Ontario Court of Appeal, Wynne has instructed Attorney General, Madeleine
Meilleur to provide advice “on the constitutional validity of this legislation, in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in the Bedford case, and our options as a government in the
event that the legislation's constitutionality is in question”.36 Political columnist John
Ivison has interpreted this to means that if the law is deemed to be constitutionally
suspect, the Ontario government will refuse to enforce it.37 A letter from members of the
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legal profession urged precisely that, however the Premier has indicated that the law will
be enforced for the time being.38
All that is clear is that the conversation on how sex work is regulated in Canada is
far from over. This thesis has provided a possible way forward and a means to structure a
vital discussion that needs to occur at the municipal level. As Lowman, and others have
stated: “The Canadian political solution to the problems created by prostitution has been
to say one thing and do another”.39 It is time for the political solution to be the
acknowledgement of the labour in the sex trade and to regulate it in accordance with the
rights sex workers so justly deserve. At the heart of the Bedford decision was the
instruction that “Parliament has the power to regulate against nuisances, but not at the
cost of the health, safety and lives of prostitutes”40, and evidence amply supports that
regulation, rather than criminalization, is the only means to achieve a safer sex trade.
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